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UGANDA NATIONAL INTEGRITY SURVEY 1998

FINAL REPORT

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National Integrity Survey: summary of key findings

The National Integrity Survey, commissioned by the Inspector General of Government, has a number of aims:

- To collect information about the experience and perceptions of corruption in public services of people living in communities throughout Uganda
- To collect information from public service workers about their views on corruption and perceptions of what constitutes corruption
- To process the information so that it forms a useful input into efforts to combat corruption in public services, at national and local levels
- To use the information to indicate what interventions might help to reduce the levels of corruption in public services
- To raise public awareness about the problem of corruption and government efforts to tackle it

The National Integrity Survey took place in the first half of 1998. It included a sample of 200 communities across all 45 districts of Uganda. In total 18,412 households and 1,595 public service workers were interviewed, and 348 focus group discussions were held in the communities. Households were asked in particular about their experiences of several key services: primary education, health, police, local administration, judiciary and URA services.

KEY FINDINGS

Experience and views about the key services

Primary education services

- Households report paying school fees for one in ten (10%) of the children supposed to be covered by Universal Primary Education.
- Parents are paying for extra tuition for nearly half of children (49%) in primary schools.
- For one in ten children (10%), parents are making extra payments direct to teachers. These unofficial payments are likely to represent some form of corruption.
- More than half (60%) of the parents are satisfied with the teaching their child is receiving.

Health, police, local administration, judiciary and URA services

Households reported on their most recent contact with any of these key services. The most commonly contacted service is health (9962 contacts), followed by police (2527 contacts) and local administration (2168 contacts).

Experience of quality of service

- There are problems with the quality of services:
  - more than two thirds of contacts (69%)require more than one day to complete dealings
  - more than half (57%) need more than two visits to complete dealings
  - in more than half (59%)of contacts the service user sees more than two different staff
- Most service users (70%) are given some sort of information about how to use the service. The information given is rated as helpful in more than half of cases (58%).

Health services do best at giving useful information. Police services do least well - only about a third (38%) of the information they give is considered by the service users to be helpful.

- Only a third of service users (32%) know how to complain about the service. Only one in seven (15%) actually make a complaint.
- Just over half of service users (55%) are satisfied with the speed of the service and just over half (55%) are satisfied with the behaviour of the service staff. More users are satisfied with health services: two thirds are satisfied with speed (65%) and staff behaviour (67%). Less users are satisfied with the police: only a third are satisfied with speed (36%) and staff behaviour (34%).

Experience of corruption

- **Four out of ten service users (40%) have to pay a bribe to service workers in order to get a service**.
- More bribes are reported in contacts with police and judiciary: two thirds (63%) pay a bribe to police and half (50%) pay a bribe to the judiciary services.
- There is less bribery in health services, but still more than a quarter (28%) of service users pay a bribe.
- The average (mean) amount of bribes paid ranges from 12,000/= for health services to 106,000/= for judiciary services.
- Nearly all the reported bribes (92%) are said to have been demanded by the service worker. Service users who offered a bribe spontaneously may be unwilling to admit this. Thus, the number of bribes reported here may be an underestimate of the total number actually paid.

What is the effect of paying a bribe?

- **Service users who pay a bribe experience a worse service than those who do not pay a bribe**
  - Users who take more than a day to complete their dealing with the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe
  - Users who make more than two visits to complete their dealing with the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe
  - Users who see more than two staff during their dealing with the service have a higher rate of paying a bribe (1.5 times higher)
  - Those who pay a bribe have more than three times the rate of being dissatisfied with the service speed and more than four times the rate of being dissatisfied with the behaviour of the service staff

What changes the rate of paying a bribe?

- Male service users have a higher rate (1.5 times higher) of paying a bribe than female service users (this is still true when the different levels of bribery in different services is taken into account).
- Users who are contacted by the service (eg by the police) have more than twice the rate of paying a bribe compared with service users who make the contact with the service themselves.
- Service users who are given helpful information about the service have only half the rate of paying a bribe compared to service users not given helpful information.

- Service users in urban communities have a higher rate (1.5 times higher) of paying a bribe than service users in rural communities.
- Users whose contact with the service was more than a year ago have a higher rate (1.5 times higher) of paying a bribe compared with service users who have more recent contacts. This may indicate some reduction in the level of bribery in the services in recent years.

Considering all the factors that affect the rate of paying a bribe together, it is possible to estimate the potential benefits of interventions to reduce the rate of paying bribes. These interventions could include:

- Reducing bureaucracy so that service users see fewer different staff
- Simplifying procedures so that service users can more often complete their dealing with the service in fewer visits
- Simplifying and streamlining procedures so that service users can more often complete their dealings with the service within one day
- Providing helpful information for service users about how to use the service, for all services and in all situations

Perceptions of service users and service workers about corruption

General views about corruption

- Most (77%) of households say they think paying bribes to get a service is 'bad'.
- Some households (18%) specify that paying bribes for public services is unfair and makes poor people in particular suffer.
- Only 7% of households think that corruption is alright or that it makes the services work
- Nearly half (46%) of service workers think that corruption leads to a bad service, especially for the poor; 22% think it makes services inefficient, 26% think it causes loss of morality and bad relations, and 16% think it deters development.

Knowledge about forms of corruption

Households were asked what forms of corruption they knew of in their district:

- Most (71%) of households know of bribery as a form of corruption
- 22% of households know of embezzlement as a form of corruption
- 19% of households know of nepotism/tribalism as a form of corruption
- Few households know about other forms of corruption
- This knowledge of individual households is confirmed in the focus group discussions held in each community

Perceptions of corruption in different services

Households were asked about which services they think are most corrupt and which they think are least corrupt.

- Nearly two thirds of households (60%) rate the police among the most corrupt services and only 2% rate the police among the least corrupt services.
- A quarter (27%) of households rate health services as among the most corrupt and 17% rate them as among the least corrupt.
- A quarter of households (25%) rate local administration as among the most corrupt services and 15% rate them as among the least corrupt.

- 15% of households rate judiciary services as among the most corrupt and only 2% rate them as among the least corrupt.
- Only 4% of households rate education as among the most corrupt services and 28% rate education as among the least corrupt.
- Only 6% of households rate the URA as among the most corrupt services and only 2% rate them as among the least corrupt.

Other services are mentioned less frequently by households as either most corrupt or least corrupt. It is clear that households give ratings (either good or bad) mainly to those services with which they have most frequent contact.

Perceptions of the level of corruption in public services

Both the public (households) and service workers were asked their views about how much corruption there is in public services.

- 70% of households think there is very much corruption in public services; 26% think there is some corruption; and only 4% think there is no corruption at all.
- 37% of service workers think there is very much corruption in public services; 56% think there is some corruption; and 7% think there is no corruption at all.

There is a clear difference between the public and service workers: the public think there is more corruption than do the service workers. This difference in perception might be an important area to explore further in finding ways to reduce corruption.

Perceptions of change in the level of corruption recently

Both the public (households) and service workers were asked what they think has happened to the level of corruption in public services over the last two years.

- 19% of households think the problem of corruption has got better; 25% think it has stayed the same; and more than half (57%) think it has got worse.
- A third (36%) of service workers think the problem of corruption has got better; 32% think it has stayed the same; and 32% think it has got worse.

Again, the perception of service workers is more positive than the perception of the public. It is of concern that more than half the public think corruption has got worse over the last two years.

Perceptions of service workers about what constitutes corruption

Given the more positive view of service workers compared with the public about levels of corruption, it is useful to understand what service workers consider to be corrupt behaviour and what they consider to be acceptable behaviour. This was explored in the interviews with 1,595 individual service workers.

- Nearly all service workers think that the behaviour of a service worker who regularly requests bribes from the public is harmful (93%) and corrupt (94%). Only 5% think this behaviour is desirable but 17% think it is justifiable. Only 6% say they would report the behaviour of this colleague.
- More than half (57%) of service workers agree that "if something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt".
- Nearly half (43%) of service workers agree that "there is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business".
- Nearly half (46%) of service workers agree that "people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it".

- A quarter (25%) of service workers say they would not know where to go to report corruption.
- One in ten (11%) of service workers consider it is not their business to report corruption and one in ten (9%) think that "people who report corruption are just troublemakers".

These views of service workers suggest there is considerable scope for efforts to educate them and change their views about what constitutes corruption and what they should do about reporting corruption.

Perceptions about causes of corruption and possible solutions to the problem

Causes of corruption

People in focus groups in each of the 200 communities in the survey were asked for their opinions of the causes of corruption in public services.

- Three quarters (77%) of the groups mentioned **low salaries and salaries not paid reliably** as a major cause of corruption.
- On the other hand, nearly half (44%) mentioned **greed on the part of service workers** as a major cause.
- Other causes mentioned less often include: poor example from the top, poor supervision of public service workers, lack of public knowledge about their rights, lack of punishment of corrupt people, lack of job security, and getting a better service by paying. This last reason was mentioned by less than one in ten focus groups, and reports of experience with services show that paying a bribe does *not* ensure a better service.

Suggestions for tackling corruption

Both the public (households) and service workers were asked what actions they thought would help to tackle corruption at national, local government and community level.

- At national level, the most popular suggestion from households (36%) is to sack or discipline corrupt workers. 19% of service workers also mentioned this, but their most popular suggestion is for better pay and conditions for workers (56%).
- Suggestions for action at local government level are similar to those for action at national level. Again, the most popular suggestion from households is to sack or discipline corrupt workers (30%), while the most popular suggestion from service workers is for better pay and conditions (31%).
- For actions at community level, the most popular suggestion from households was to report corruption (48%); this was also the most popular suggestion from service workers (72%).

Knowledge about anti-corruption agencies already in place

All households were asked if they had heard of the IGG and, if so, what they think the IGG does.

- A third (32%) of households have heard of the IGG. This figure varies across the country, from 6% in Kisoro and 8% in Adjumani and Moyo, to 69% in Kampala.
- Of those households who have heard of the IGG, half (50%) are not able to say what the IGG does.
- Only 77 households among all the 18,412 in the survey (0.4%) report having made a complaint to the IGG.

There is clearly much to be done to bring the IGG to the attention of the majority of people in Uganda.

Differences between districts

The Table shows the 45 districts ranked in order of the percentage of service users who paid a bribe. The percentage varies from 73% to 11%. The Table also shows the percentage of households in each district who think there is very much corruption in public services in the district. There is not a good correlation between the percentage of service users paying a bribe and the percentage of households who think there is very much corruption. In some districts, relatively few service users paid a bribe, yet a high proportion of households think there is very much corruption in the district. This probably reflects public awareness of other forms of corruption (such as embezzlement).

Payment of bribes, perceptions of level of corruption and awareness of the IGG in different districts (ranked by percentage of service users paying a bribe)

District	% of service users who paid a bribe	% of households who think corruption in district is very much	% of households who are aware of the IGG
Mbale (16)	343 (73)	517 (88)	135 (24)
Mukono (29)	284 (64)	373 (73)	191 (36)
Tororo (22)	196 (61)	452 (92)	80 (16)
Lira (10)	237 (60)	368 (91)	122 (37)
Iganga (23)	290 (60)	441 (88)	130 (26)
Mubende (33)	198 (54)	358 (84)	121 (29)
Kumi (18)	138 (51)	161 (55)	87 (30)
Apach (15)	157 (50)	342 (91)	104 (27)
Masaka (35)	136 (49)	253 (52)	93 (19)
Kabale (42)	175 (47)	168 (67)	99 (37)
Bugiri (24)	110 (46)	167 (58)	41 (17)
Busia (25)	93 (46)	192 (69)	56 (19)
Kamuli (26)	129 (46)	261 (71)	82 (21)
Gulu (11)	146 (42)	369 (90)	101 (25)
Kitgum (12)	100 (41)	318 (86)	87 (29)
Kampala (28)	270 (40)	427 (87)	320 (65)
Bundibugyo (04)	96 (39)	353 (88)	53 (19)
Soroti (17)	103 (39)	156 (61)	70 (25)
Luwero (30)	97 (39)	329 (71)	154 (34)
Arua (08)	148 (37)	322 (65)	141 (29)
Pallisa (19)	110 (36)	199 (72)	74 (26)
Mpigi (32)	131 (36)	348 (75)	145 (29)
Nebbi (09)	50 (35)	196 (59)	60 (18)
Rukungiri (41)	140 (35)	308 (65)	135 (27)
Katakwi (20)	79 (34)	54 (24)	80 (34)

District	% of service users who paid a bribe	% of households who think corruption in district is very much	% of households who are aware of the IGG
Moyo (07)	57 (33)	237 (91)	17 (8)
Kiboja (34)	111 (32)	322 (82)	139 (35)
Kibaale (02)	90 (30)	171 (67)	83 (27)
Mbarara (45)	233 (29)	546 (84)	217 (33)
Kalangala (38)	72 (28)	140 (44)	76 (20)
Kapchorwa (21)	118 (27)	257 (66)	97 (25)
Kabarole (03)	107 (26)	331 (74)	104 (24)
Sembabule (37)	70 (26)	149 (46)	78 (34)
Kasese (39)	66 (26)	197 (50)	81 (21)
Jinja (27)	101 (25)	287 (79)	112 (29)
Masindi (05)	68 (24)	233 (80)	95 (37)
Hoima (01)	41 (23)	154 (81)	56 (28)
Bushenyi (40)	76 (22)	220 (53)	142 (35)
Rakai (36)	71 (21)	287 (62)	136 (32)
Nakasongola (31)	68 (18)	154 (50)	128 (38)
Adjumani (06)	69 (17)	311 (77)	34 (8)
Moroto (14)	27 (17)	191 (69)	85 (22)
Kotido (13)	29 (14)	273 (74)	91 (25)
Ntungamo (44)	53 (13)	136 (43)	222 (58)
Kisoro (43)	50 (11)	110 (24)	27 (6)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Inspectorate of Government has wide reaching duties and powers to prevent and tackle corruption under the Constitution of 1995. It is against this background that the Inspectorate of Government decided to seek assistance to carry out the first national integrity survey in Uganda.

The first national integrity survey is designed to collect information about the experience and perceptions of corruption in public services of people living in communities throughout Uganda. It is also intended as a key input into the efforts to build integrity in public services, and throughout society, at both national and local levels. The survey is designed to give insights into what interventions might be expected to help reduce levels of corruption and increase integrity. A further purpose of the process is to increase awareness among citizens of the need to tackle corruption and include them as partners in the fight against corruption and the pressure for more integrity in public life. While individuals find it very hard to have their views on this issue heard, collectively their voice is strong and can both support current anti-corruption efforts by government and exert pressure for more action.

The process of building integrity in Uganda has so far been mainly driven from the top, with strong leadership from the President. This survey and the dissemination and use of its findings now provides the opportunity for including the great majority of Ugandans in this effort. The problem of corruption is not one that can be solved overnight, but drawing on the collective energies of the people greatly increases the chances of success. One way of measuring that success is to repeat the national integrity survey at intervals, perhaps annually. This will assess progress, indicate areas needing more attention and indicate other actions which might help in the future.

Methods

The methodology employed in the national integrity survey draws on Ugandan capacities built since 1993 with UNICEF support and more specifically the 1995 SDS, consolidating the national capacities to do this sort of survey, based on techniques for community-based measurement known as Sentinel **Community Surveillance (SCS)**[2]. This method combines modern epidemiology and opinion research techniques with qualitative Rapid Assessment Procedures to gather evidence while involving clients in the process of evidence-based planning.

The survey process was overseen by a **Steering Group**, consisting of representatives from IGG, UNDP, DANIDA, Decentralisation and CIET. This group had the remit to receive and approve the survey instruments and to receive the inception report and progress reports during the period of the survey work. A smaller **Technical Group**, including collaboration from the Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics at Makerere University worked on the design of instruments and data entry programmes and later undertook training of supervisers in Kampala and in regional centres, supervised the field work in districts, and assisted with coding of qualitative instruments (mainly focus group discussions).

The survey included **sites (communities) from all 45 districts in Uganda**. 200 sites were included in the survey, each of 100 households. There were 3-7 sites per district. The **selection of the sites** in each district was a two-stage process. First, all communities in the district were listed and

then stratified accordingly to administrative boundaries and other relevant factors. Then sites were randomly selected from the stratified list. The urban sites were selected separately from among listed urban sites in the district.

The survey includes:
- 200 sites
- 18,412 households
- 94,481 people in the households
- 348 focus group discussions
- 178 key informant interviews
- 1,595 service worker interviews

Training of supervisers was in five key districts across the country, with further training of interviewers in each district. Data collection was by teams of five interviewers and two supervisers in each district.

The survey sought information specifically about a number of key services: primary education, health, police, local administration, judiciary and URA.

Survey instruments:
- A household questionnaire
- A focus group discussion guide
- A key informant interview
- A service workers questionnaire

Data coding and entry used the Epi Info package and was done in Kampala. Analysis used Epi Info software ans SPSS software for some aspects. Weights were derived to take into account the relative sample population in each district compared with the relative population in each district. These weights are used for the calculation of indicators at national level. Weighted and unweighted figures are in fact very similar.

Results

Primary education services

More than a quarter (28%) of children in primary school have repeated at least one class. The four children per household recorded are those supposed to be covered by Universal Primary Education (UPE), yet for one in ten children households report still paying school fees. For nearly half of the children in primary school, parents are paying for extra tuition and for one in ten they are making extra payments directly to the teachers. Payments to teachers like this are mainly unofficial - in effect they are likely to represent some form of corruption.

For more than half the children in primary school (60%), the household reports being satisfied with the teaching the child is receiving. There is little difference in the proportion of parents satisfied between those who paid and those who did not pay for different items.

The education service is not considered one of the most corrupt public services. When asked which are the worst and best services for corruption, only 4% of households mentioned education as one of the worst, while 28% mentioned education as one of the least corrupt services.

Experience of other key services

Households gave information about contacts with health, police, local administration, judiciary and URA services. The most frequently contacted service is health, followed by police and local administration. In most cases (85%), the contact was initiated by the service user. In nearly all cases (93%), the individual contacting the service went there in person (or was contacted in person). About one in five service users (21%) have help from a friend or relative within the service.

Service quality
More than two thirds (69%) of service contacts require more than one day to complete dealings. More than half of contacts (57%) need more than two visits to complete dealing with the matter; and in a similar proportion (59%) the service user sees more than two different staff to deal with the matter.

Information about the service
For most service contacts (70%), service users are given some sort of information about how to use the service. The information is spoken in 41%, written in 12% and both in 17%. More than half the information given (58%) is helpful, a quarter (25%) is 'somewhat helpful' and 16% is 'not helpful at all'. Health services do best both at giving information and that information being useful to service users. Police services give information about as often as other services, but it is rated as helpful in only about a third of cases (38%).

Complaining about the service
Only a third of service users (32%) know how to complain about the service. And only one in seven (15%) of service users actually made a complaint about the service.

Satisfaction with services
Just over half of service users (55%) are satisfied with the speed of the service and the same proportion (55%) are satisfied with the behaviour of the service staff. Health services are rated more positively for speed and staff behaviour than the others, with two thirds of the users being satisfied with both these aspects. The police rate worst: only a third of users are satisfied with speed and only a third are satisfied with staff behaviour.

A small proportion of service users (6%) use a broker to help them in their dealings with the service. The proportion using a broker is lower for health and local administration contacts than for contacts with the other services. Mean payments to brokers vary from 5,000/= (health) to 112,000/= (judiciary). Some payments to brokers may be legitimate; for example, a solicitor or barrister for contacts with the judiciary. But some are a form of corruption, where the broker is a go-between for unofficial payments from service users to service workers.

Experience of corruption in the services

Four out of ten service users (40%) have to pay a bribe to workers in key public services in order to get a service.

The services where bribery is most common are the police and judiciary, with two thirds of users paying a bribe to the workers in the police and half of users paying a bribe to workers in the judiciary services. The highest mean amounts of bribes are for contacts with the judiciary (106,000/=). Health services have less bribery (although still more than a quarter of contacts involve a bribe) and the average amounts paid are less (12,000/=).

Nearly all (92%) of the payments to service workers are said to have been requested by the worker, rather than offered spontaneously. It may be that service users who offered a payment spontaneously are not willing to admit to this; thus the total number of bribes paid may actually be even higher than reported here.

Factors related to paying bribes
A number of variables increase the rate of paying a bribe:

- Male service users have 1.5 times the rate of paying a bribe
- Users contacted by the service have more than twice the rate of paying a bribe compared with those who initiate the contact themselves.

- Those whose dealings take more than a day to complete have twice the rate of paying a bribe.
- Those who need more than two visits to complete their dealing with the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe.
- Those who see more than two service staff have a higher rate of paying a bribe than those who see only one or two staff.
- Service users not given helpful information about the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe compared to those given helpful information.
- The rate of paying a bribe in a contact more than a year ago is nearly one and a half times compared with more recent contacts.
- The rate of paying a bribe for users in urban sites is nearly one and a half times compared with users in rural sites.
- Service users who pay a bribe have more than three times the rate of being dissatisfied with the service speed and more than four times the rate of being dissatisfied with the staff behaviour.

When the effects of all these variables (except satisfaction levels as this is not a potential cause of paying bribes but rather an effect) are considered together in a logistic regression analysis it is possible to estimate the potential effects of changing different variables on the risk of paying bribes. This is shown in Table 27 in the report.

Perceptions about corruption

Most households and service workers say they think that paying bribes to service workers is bad and makes for a worse service. The common forms of corruption known to households are bribery, embezzlement and nepotism/tribalism. In rating services for levels of corruption, the police is rated the worst. Nearly two thirds of households rate the police as one of the most corrupt services and only 2% rate the police as one of the least corrupt services.

Households perceive a higher level of corruption in public service than do service workers (70% vs 37% think there is 'very much' corruption). This difference in perception between the public and service workers is important to address as part of efforts to tackle corruption. More than half of households think the problem of corruption has got worse in the last two years and only one in five think it has got better. For service workers, there is an even spread in opinion between the situation being better, the same or worse.

Views of service workers about what constitutes corruption

Service workers, when asked their views about corruption and related issues, gave some answers that are concerning. More than half the service workers think that if something is done 'for the right reasons' it is not corrupt. The 'right reasons' could include that the person concerned needs the money to keep his family. Nearly half the workers think that gifts from private companies to public sector employees are quite alright. It is startling that nearly half of those interviewed think that people reporting corruption are likely to suffer for it. This does not suggest they will be keen to report corruption themselves. And in any case, a quarter of them claim they would not know to go to report, one in ten think it is not their business to report and one in ten even think that those who report corruption are just troublemakers.

Knowledge about the IGG

Overall, about a third (32%) of households have heard of the IGG. However, this figure varies quite a bit in different areas of the

country, as shown in Annex 6. The proportion who have heard of the IGG varies from 6% in Kisoro and 8% in Adjumani and Moyo to 69% in Kampala. Of those who have heard of the IGG, only about a third know that the IGG investigates allegations of corruption but half cannot say what the IGG does.

Suggestions for tackling corruption

Households and service workers were asked what action they think could be taken to tackle the problem of corruption at three levels: national government, local government and communities themselves. For actions by central government service workers and households suggest the same sorts of actions. But service workers are less ready to suggest sacking and disciplining corrupt workers and more ready to suggest improving pay and conditions. Nevertheless, enforcement actions rate highly for both groups. The actions suggested for local government are very much the same as those suggested for central government. Interestingly, for actions at local level, service workers are more keen than the households to suggest that the communities should report cases of corruption.

Conclusions

This survey shows the extent of corruption in public services and pinpoints the services most affected. A striking finding is that service users who pay bribes do not get a better service than those who do not. On the contrary, they take longer to have their business completed, see more staff and pay more visits to the service. Reduction of service bureaucracy so as to reduce the number of visits and the number of staff seen is one action that could reduce the risk of paying bribes. Another is the provision of information to service users about how to use the services. Other possible areas to tackle include: the perceptions of service workers; the belief (sometimes well founded) that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it; the difference in perception of levels of corruption between service workers and service users; the lack of awareness in most households of the IGG and its role.

This survey provides a baseline for judging the effects of actions to curb corruption in public services. It also provides pointers about which actions might be most effective in the fight against this pervasive evil.

Acknowledgements

Many people contributed to the success of this project. The names of all those who played a part in the work at both national level and district level are given in Annex 3.

The collaboration with the Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics at Makerere University was particularly important and the cooperation of George W. Kibirige, Director, and the hard and effective work of the team from the ISAE (listed in Annex 3) is gratefully acknowledged. The data entry clerks working with the ISAE did a good job and deserve thanks for their hard work.

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The project would not have been possible without the hard work of the teams in all the districts, listed in Annex 3.

Last, but certainly not least, thanks are due to the 18,412 households who answered questions, the participants of the 348 focus groups, and the 1,595 service workers who were interviewed in this survey. Their willingness to give their time to this survey made it possible. It is hoped that the survey findings can help in the fight against corruption so that people like those who took part in the survey will experience less corruption in public services in the future.

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Statistical and epidemiological terms

This report is deliberately written avoiding too many specialised statistical and epidemiological terms. However, some are unavoidable. A brief explanation of the main terms used in the report is given here; readers who are interested in more detailed explanations could refer to a textbook on modern epidemiological methods.

95% confidence interval:
A measure of the accuracy of an estimate, based on the normal distribution curve. The true value is 95% likely to lie between the upper and lower values of the 95% confidence interval.

Standard Deviation:
A measure of the spread of the distribution of a variable, based on the normal distribution curve. 99% of the population will have values within +/- two standard deviations from the mean value of the variable.

Odds Ratio:
One way of estimating Relative Risk. In a 2X2 table, with cells a,b,c,d, the Odds Ratio is calculated by ad/bc.

Relative Risk:
The risk in one group compared with another group (for example the risk of stunting in girls compared with the risk of stunting in boys). When the actual rates in each group are known (for example, the total number and the number with stunting), the relative risk can be estimated either by the Odds Ratio or by the Rate Ratio (the rate in one group divided by the rate in the other group). In a case-referent study, only the Odds Ratio can be calculated. For relatively rare conditions, the two estimates of Relative Risk give a similar answer. There is discussion about which estimate of Relative Risk it is better to use. For further details, a textbook of modern epidemiology should be consulted. In SCS methodology, the Odds Ratio is used as the estimate of Relative Risk.

The Relative Risk or Odds Ratio gives an idea of the risk for an **individual** in one group compared with an individual in another group (for example, a child of a literate mother compared with a child of an illiterate mother). It is therefore most useful when making decisions about the most benefit for an individual child (such as those taken by a mother for her child).

Risk Difference:
The risk in one group minus the risk in another group (for example the risk in children of illiterate mothers minus the risk in children of literate mothers). The risk difference can only be calculated when the rates in both groups are known.

The Risk Difference gives an idea of the risk for a **group** and how this could be changed by an action. It is most useful for planners who are considering how many children could benefit from an intervention.

INTRODUCTION

The Inspectorate of Government was established in 1986 and following the 1995 Constitution it has the following functions:

1. To promote and foster strict adherence to the rule of law and principles of natural justice in administration
2. To eliminate and foster elimination of corruption, abuse of authority and of public office
3. To promote fair, efficient and good governance in public offices
4. To enforce or supervise the enforcement of the leadership code of conduct
5. To investigate any act, omission, advice, decision or recommendation by a public officer or any other authority taken, given or done in exercise of administrative functions
6. To stimulate the public awareness about the values of constitutionalism

It is against this background that the Inspectorate of Government decided to seek assistance to carry out the first national integrity survey in Uganda.

In talking about integrity, it is recognised Ugandan society rests on certain pillars of integrity: the judiciary, the police, the media, the political and traditional leaders, among others. Some of these pillars are in need of renewal, others will benefit from reinforcement. In order for the Office of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) to play its role in this renewal and reinforcement of existing pillars of integrity, it requires detailed information on the performance and the way they are viewed by the public. In particular, evidence is needed about the extent and modalities of corruption in the Ugandan public service. Although not as newsworthy as grand corruption, petty corruption in the public services undermines the pillars of integrity.

Corruption can be in the form of unofficial user fees, kickbacks or even free time from services not performed. It is not only the large-scale larceny of contract rigging, kickbacks, grease payments, misuse or simply misappropriation of public funds. It is also the *management and implementation environment* of public services. Under-the-table user charges, absenteeism, sale of drugs or fertilisers that should be dispensed free of charge, sale of examination papers -- all these represent misuse of public power for private gain.

From the perspective of a community, corruption in public services is essentially looting of the public wealth. It creates a favourable environment for grand corruption. From a service management perspective, corruption in public services means a tapping into of public service resources already too scanty or overstretched to do the job properly. Stakeholders lose time waiting in queues, going through gatekeepers added to and living off the service process, paying additional user fees and, worst of all, getting inferior and ineffective services. Corruption in public services is not accompanied, as is held by its proponents, by an increase in effectiveness. This was highlighted in a service delivery survey in Uganda in 1995[1]. Ugandan peasants rarely have the benefit of visits from agricultural extension agents, with agents apparently claiming more visits than actually made. The farmers consider their livestock and crop production suffer as a result.

Good governance means that decisions and control of resources are increasingly representative and increasingly accountable; it means that there are regular procedures for exercising accountability; that "consent of the governed" has a real and implementable content; and that a social climate is fostered

to increase participation of civil society. The measure of good governance is the extent to which civil society has a hand in the generation and ordering of evidence for decision-taking; so is the extent to which civil society is able to engage systemically in that decision-taking. The extent to which civil society is able to perceive the productive force of their decisions, to be inspired and empowered by them, is the implementable content of good governance.

The first national integrity survey is designed to collect information about the experience and perceptions of corruption in public services of people living in communities throughout Uganda. It is also intended as a key input into the efforts to build integrity in public services, and throughout society, at both national and local levels. The survey is designed to give insights into what interventions might be expected to help reduce levels of corruption and increase integrity. A further purpose of the process is to increase awareness among citizens of the need to tackle corruption and include them as partners in the fight against corruption and the pressure for more integrity in public life. While individuals find it very hard to have their views on this issue heard, collectively their voice is strong and can both support current anti-corruption efforts by government and exert pressure for more action.

The process of building integrity in Uganda has so far been mainly driven from the top, with strong leadership from the President. This survey and the dissemination and use of its findings now provides the opportunity for including the great majority of Ugandans in this effort. The problem of corruption is not one that can be solved overnight, but drawing on the collective energies of the people greatly increases the chances of success. One way of measuring that success is to repeat the national integrity survey at intervals, perhaps annually. This will assess progress, indicate areas needing more attention and indicate other actions which might help in the future.

This report is intended as the first step in dissemination of the findings of the national integrity survey. The findings will be reported and discussed at the National Integrity Workshop in Entebbe in August 1998. At this workshop, a draft Integrity Action Plan will be drawn up, based largely on the findings of this nartional integrity survey. It is planned to follow this national workshop with a series of district level workshops, to involve the greatest possible number of people at all levels in discussing the findings and planning actions to build integrity and tackle corruption.

METHODS

Methodological approach

The methodology employed in the national integrity survey draws on Ugandan capacities built during the 1995 SDS, consolidating the national capacities to do this sort of survey, based on techniques for community-based measurement known as Sentinel Community Surveillance (SCS)[2]. This method combines modern epidemiology and opinion research techniques with qualitative Rapid Assessment Procedures to gather evidence while involving clients in the process of evidence-based planning.

The SCS methodology was originally conceived to build capacities while producing accurate, detailed and actionable data rapidly and at low cost.

Ordinarily, SCS focuses on the use of epidemiological data in local or national planning . This may be at the level of a municipality, a city, a state, a number of provinces or an entire country. The approach permits community-based fact finding through a reiterative process, addressing one set of issues at a time. SCS is a cross-design of qualitative and quantitative techniques that permits a holistic picture of -- and locally designed solutions to -- a particular problem. It is a cost-effective way to collect community data, presenting them in an appropriate form for planning at local, regional and national levels. Some of the main features of SCS methodology are shown in the box.

Features of SCS methodology

- Data collected from cluster sites, selected to be representative of a district, a region or a country.
- Repeated cyclical process, each cycle including planning and instrument design, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and communication of results.
- Each cycle focuses on particular area or problem, not trying to collect data on a wide range of problems.
- Quantitative data from household questionnaires combined with qualitative data from focus groups, key informant interviews and institutional reviews *from the same communities* (that is, the data are coterminous) to allow a better understanding of the quantitative data. This combined analysis is called mesoanalysis.
- Data analysis not only in terms of indicators (for example, rate of childhood measles) but also in terms of *risk* (for example the risk of measles in an unvaccinated child compared with a vaccinated child).
- Analysis gives results in a form that assists planning at household, community, district and national levels.
- The same sites are revisited in subsequent cycles of data collection, allowing easy estimation of changes over time or as a result of intervention.
- Each cycle of data collection and analysis requires a communication strategy to get the information to those who need it for planning.
- Transfer of skills of data collection, analysis and communication over a number of cycles is an explicit aim.

Administrative arrangements for the survey

The survey process was overseen by a Steering Group, consisting of representatives from IGG, UNDP, DANIDA, Decentralisation and CIET. This group had the remit to receive and approve the survey instruments and to receive the inception report and progress reports during the period of the survey work. A smaller Technical Group worked on the design of instruments and data entry programmes. This same

group became the Implementation Group, undertaking training of supervisers in Kampala and in regional centres, supervising the field work in several districts, and assisting with coding of qualitative instruments (mainly focus group discussions). The composition of the Implementation Group is shown in Annex 3.

The survey sample

A deliberate decision was taken to include sites in the survey from all 45 districts in Uganda. The sites in each district should represent the situation in that district, as far as possible. The overall budget constrained the total number of sites that could be included in the survey to 200, each of 100 households. The number of sites per district varied between 3 (for the smallest districts) and 7 for the largest districts. The number of survey sites per district was decided on the basis of the relative size of the population of the district, projected from the 1991 census. Table A1.1 in Annex 1 shows the number of urban and rural sample sites allocated per district. The proportion of urban sites allocated in the sample (27/200) is in approximate proportion to the proportion of the population living in urban locations in Uganda. Note that in Kitgum and Gulu a deliberate decision was taken to allocate two out of the four sites in each district as urban sites; this was mainly to reflect the higher proportion of the population in these districts now living in urban and peri-urban locations due to the security situation.

The selection of the sites in each district was done at district level, beginning during the training for district supervisers in regional centres (see below). The aim was to select sites to represent as well as possible the spread of conditions within the district. The selection was a two-stage process. First, all communities in the district were listed and then stratified accordingly to administrative boundaries and other relevant factors, such as access to services, terrain and ethnicity (where relevant). The final stage was a random selection of sites from the stratified list. The urban sites were selected separately from among listed urban sites in the district. Table A1.2 in Annex 1 shows the sites selected within each of the 45 districts, indicating which are the urban sites. Table A1.2 also shows the number of households finally interviewed in each of the sites.

As well as the household sample in each district, a sample of service workers was interviewed. The supervisers were instructed to interview teachers, police officers and health workers in each site if possible, with judiciary and revenue workers and local administration staff interviewed in the district headquarters. They were instructed to try to interview 10 workers from each service, giving a total of 60 interviews per district. The selection of workers to interview was no more complex than taking the opportunity to interview those encountered, on the basis that this would be largely at random. There was deliberately no notice given about interviewing service workers, so as not to cause concerns and possibly bias answers.

Design and testing of instruments for the survey

Instrument design was undertaken by the

Figure 1. Some of the implementation group

Technical/Implementation Group and the instruments were approved by the Steering Group. The design of the instruments was based upon the instruments used in a previous, smaller corruption survey in Tanzania that used the same methodological approach[4]. The data collection instruments for the survey include a household questionnaire, a focus group guide (to be administered separately to groups of men and women), a key informant interview schedule and a service workers questionnaire.

Survey instruments:
- A household questionnaire
- A focus group discussion guide
- A key informant interview
- A service workers questionnaire

In addition to these basic data collection instruments, other instruments included a community summary report, used for feeding back the findings to each community at the end of the day's data collection (see below) and a district preliminary findings summary report, used for informing each district of their basic preliminary findings at the end of the data collection in that district. A further guide, for discussing the preliminary findings in each district and noting the reactions of the district administrations, was also designed, but in the event very few of the district teams were able to use it during the survey period. The instruments for the survey are shown in Annex 2.

The survey instruments were field tested in a village just outside Kampala. This field testing was undertaken during the training of field supervisers from nine 'key' districts that took place in Kampala at the Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics at Makerere University in February 1998. The field supervisers from the key districts assisted with the field testing of the instruments as well as making an input into the final version of the instruments to be tested. The field testing resulted in some minor modifications to the instruments.

Training and fieldwork

For the purposes of training of supervisers and interviewers, the country was divided into groups of districts, based around five 'key' districts that had participated in previous cycles of sentinel community surveillance (SCS) in Uganda, including the baseline service delivery survey[1] and the UNICEF sponsored SCS scheme[5], operating in nine districts at the time of the national integrity survey. These five 'key' districts are: Hoima, Lira, Mbale, Rakai and Mbarara. Hoima and Mbale were chosen as being more accessible for neighbouring districts than Kibaale and Kapchorwa, but the field supervisers for the Western and Eastern regions also came from Kibaale and Kapchorwa.

The first training session was for the field supervisers from the 'key' districts and this was held in Kampala at the Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics (ISAE) in Makerere University . This included input from the field supervisers into the finalisation of the survey instruments.

The subsequent training and data collection was divided into two phases. Training and fieldwork in the first group of 27 districts (in the East, North and West) took place between 22 February and 18 March. Five teams from Kampala (each of two people) supervised training in the training districts of Hoima, Lira and Mbale and the subsequent training of interviewers and data collection in the surrounding districts. For each district, two supervisers were trained in the regional centre over three days, including field training of use of the instruments. These supervisers were identified by the Chief Administrative Officer in each district, following a written request from the IGG.

Most of the supervisers were drawn from the District Planning Office or had a similar function in the district.

Particular training was given to district supervisers in how to conduct focus group discussions, since this was something new to may of them who were more used to dealing with collection and use of quantitative data. The training included mock focus group sessions in the classroom as well as actual focus groups in the field practice sites.

The supervisers returned to their districts after training and identified teams of 5 interviewers. The supervisers, together with one of the teams from Kampala, trained the interviewers in their district for two days, including field practice with the household questionnaire. The teams from Kampala arranged with the districts around each regional centre to 'stagger' their training and fieldwork so that a Kampala team could be with them during their training of interviewers and also be present for at least some of the fieldwork. This additional layer of supervision was to help with quality control of the data collection.

Immediately after completing in each district, the district teams visited the selected sites to collect data. Each site was covered in one day; the interviewers undertook the household interviews (20 households each per day) and the supervisers checked their work at the end of the day. While the household interviews were taking place, the supervisers conducted focus groups (one of men, one of women) in each site, interviewed key informants and administered the service workers questionnaire.

Training and fieldwork for the second group of 18 districts (in the Centre and SouthWest) took place between 22 March and 10 April. The process was the same as for the first group of districts. The training for supervisers in the second group of districts took place in Rakai and Mbarara.

Figure 2. A focus group in Gulu district

The districts covered by each of the five training centres and by individual teams from Kampala can be seen in Table A1.1 in Annex 1. The districts between each of the heavy lines were covered by one of the Kampala teams. Districts with code numbers up to 27 were in the first phase of training and fieldwork and those with higher numbers were in the second phase.

The Implementation Group from Kampala who undertook training and supervision in the field are shown in Annex 3. Annex 3 also shows the supervisers and interviewers from each of the 45 districts.

Data coding and data entry

Data coding and data entry took place in Kampala. The data for each district were returned to Kampala. The supervising team from Kampala carried back all the data that were ready by the time they left a region and the data from districts who had not completed their fieldwork before the supervising team left delivered their data to Kampala subsequently. Most districts delivered their data promptly but there were some delays to data entry caused by delays in delivering data to Kampala.

A team of coders/data entry clerks was recruited, many of them students or with some other link to the ISAE. The coding/data entry team is shown in Annex 3. They were trained in the coding of the quantitative data and the data entry process and then undertook this task under supervision. Coding and data entry for the first group of districts began while the

Figure 3. One of the data entry clerks at work

fieldwork of the second group of districts was taking place. Data from the household questionnaires, the key informant interviews and the service workers questionnaires was coded and entered in this way.

Data entry used the Epi Info software package[6]. A comprehensive data entry programme for the household questionnaire was created to assist data entry and to reduce the opportunity for errors. The data from the household questionnaire (the main quantitative instrument) were entered twice (by different data entry clerks) and validated using the Epi Info VALIDATE programme. This allows key stroke errors to be identified and subsequently corrected.

The focus group reports were handled differently. First, one person read through a sample of the reports and developed a set of themes commonly mentioned by the groups in discussing different issues. Then the implementation group sat together and each person read through a batch of reports. If new themes were identified, these were agreed with the group and added to the list of themes. Each member of the group coded their batch of reports by noting by the report the code number of themes that were mentioned in the report (they were often mentioned in different orders). At the same time, the group each extracted from the reports particularly apt quotations and stories recorded about individual experiences of corruption.

The codes from the reports were transcribed onto data entry sheets and then entered into a file including the site number to allow the information to be related to the household data.

Data analysis

Figure 4. Coding the focus group reports

Data analysis began once a complete, clean data set was achieved. Analysis was undertaken using the Epi Info software package[6]. Analysis of multiple response questions (such as those where respondents could give up to three answers to a question) was undertaken using the SPSS statistical package[7]. Multiple logistic regression of the variables associated with an increased risk of paying bribes was carried out using SPSS.

The data from each district were **weighted** when used in aggregate to calculate figures for the whole of Uganda. This is necessary because the relative sample population in

each district is not exactly the same as the relative actual population in the district. Thus, without weighting, some districts in the sample are over-represented and some under-represented. The weighting process adjusts for this. In practice, the unweighted figures are not very different from the weighted figures. This is partly because the levels of most of the indicators are not widely different in different districts, and partly because the relative sample populations in the districts are not too far from the relative actual populations. This last is because the number of sites allocated to each district took into account their relative populations.

Annex 4 shows the calculation of the district weights, based on the 1998 population projections from the 1991 census. Note that for the set of new districts, they have been considered together with the district they have sub-divided from for the purposes of weighting. Annex 4 also shows the weighted and unweighted values of key national indicators.

The weighted values of indicators were calculated using the CSAMPLE programme of Epi Info. In this report, weighted values are quoted for national level indicators, unless specified otherwise. Note that for risk analysis (looking at, for example, the risk of paying bribes in relation to other variables) the figures are not weighted as this is not necessary for this relative exercise.

Annex 6 shows the main findings in the survey for each of the 45 districts separately. In due course, it is intended to produce reports for the findings from each district in the appropriate local language so that they can be used for planning of district integrity systems.

RESULTS

Background information: the households in the survey

The survey includes:
- 200 sites
- 18,412 households
- 94,481 people in the households
- 348 focus group discussions
- 178 key informant interviews
- 1,595 service worker interviews

The total numbers in the survey are shown in the box. In some sites less than 100 households were interviewed. The number of households interviewed in each site is shown in Annex 1, Table A1.2.
The occupation of the household head among the 18,412 households interviewed is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Occupation of household head

Occupation	No. (%) of households
Farmer/peasant	10907 (60)
Trader	2632 (14)
Teacher	853 (5)
Mason/builder/mechanic	787 (4)
Civil servant	455 (3)
Casual labourer	674 (4)
Veteran/pensioner	80 (0.4)
Unemployed	388 (2)
Artisan/cook/hairdresser	379 (2)
Local govt/ admin	85 (0.5)
Church	96 (0.5)
Health worker	147 (1)
Police/security	163 (1)
Other professional	157 (1)
Self employed	188 (1)
Admin/secretarial	199 (1)
Student	80 (0.4)

The proportion of households with the occupation of the household head recorded as 'farmer or peasant' is lower in urban sites (28%) than in rural sites (65%), while the proportion of 'traders' is higher in urban sites than in rural sites (24% vs 13%).

Most of the households (14,551 - 79%) have a male household head. The proportion of households with a female head is higher in urban sites (27%) than in rural sites (20%).

The education level of the household head in the households in the sample is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Education of household head

Education level	No. (%) of households		
	Urban	Rural	Total
None	295(12)	2869(19)	3164(18)
P1 - P3	99(4)	1540(10)	1639(9)
P4 - P7	752(31)	6543(42)	7295(41)
S1 - S3	306(13)	1722(11)	2028(11)
S4 - S6	541(22)	1874(12)	2415(13)
Post primary	181(7)	523(3)	704(4)
Post secondary	279(11)	433(3)	712(4)
Adult education	3(0.1)	8(0.1)	11(0.1)

Table 2 shows that household heads in urban sites have a higher level of education than those in rural sites.

Female household heads have a lower level of education than male household heads, as shown in Table 3. Male household heads are three times more likely than female household heads to be educated to P4 level or above.

Table 3. Sex and education of household head

Sex of household head	Education level of household head	
	P4 and above	None or up to P3
Male	11106 (78%)	3101 (22%)
Female	2055 (55%)	1701 (45%)
	Odds ratio=2.96 (95%CI 2.74-3.20)	

The sex and relationship to household head was noted of the person who responded to the questionnaire on behalf of the household. Just over half (53%) of the respondents are male. Two thirds (67%) of respondents are household heads and a quarter (27%) are wives of household heads. Sons and daughters of household heads account for 2% of respondents each.

The number of household members varies from 1 to 50. The mean household size is 5.14 members (4.98 in urban sites and 5.16 in rural sites). The age distribution of males and females in the sample households is shown in Figure 5, with age groups along the horizontal axis. There is an apparent excess of females between the ages of 15 and 29 years.

Figure 5. Age distribution of the population



Household experiences and perceptions of primary education services

More than half the households (56%) in the survey have at least one child attending primary school. For each child in primary school (up to four children), information was sought about the class attended, class repetition, payments for various items and satisfaction with the teaching the child is receiving.

Table 4 shows the class being attended by the children included in the survey. There is a steady reduction in numbers with increasing grade, resulting from repetition of earlier grades and drop-out.

Table 4. Class attended by children in primary school

Class	No. (%) of children
P1	5396 (23)
P2	5090 (22)
P3	3928 (17)
P4	3251 (14)
P5	2443 (10)
P6	2028 (9)
P7	1488 (6)

Table 5 shows the number of times children are reported by their parents to have repeated classes. Nearly a quarter of children have repeated one class, with fewer repeating more often.

Table 5. Class repetition by children in primary school

Classes repeated	No. (%) of children
None	16480 (72)
One	5353 (24)
Two	745 (3)
Three	162 (0.7)
Four	34 (0.1)
Five	14 (0.1)

Households were asked about payments for books and stationery, uniforms and shoes, travel to school, school fees, tuition fees, and payments directly to teachers. The proportion of children for whom payment was made for each item and the mean amounts paid are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Payments for children in primary school

Item	No. (%) children for whom paid	Mean payment (Ug Shs)
Books, pens etc	21490 (94)	3,412
Uniform, shoes	20193 (88)	5,870
Travel to school	550 (3)	14,764
School fees	2088 (10)	12,394
Tuition fees	10789 (49)	5,446
Teacher directly	2204 (10)	6,959

The four children per household recorded are those supposed to be covered by Universal Primary Education (UPE), yet for one in ten children households report still paying school fees. For nearly half of the children in primary school, parents are paying for extra tuition and for one in ten they are making extra payments directly to the teachers. Payments to teachers like this are mainly unofficial - in effect they are likely to represent some form of corruption.

For more than half the children in primary school (60%), the household reports being satisfied with the teaching the child is receiving. There is little difference in the proportion of parents satisfied between those who paid and those who did not pay for different items. However, for those children who have repeated more classes, the proportion of parents who are satisfied with teaching is less, falling from 60% for children who have never repeated a class to 44% for children who have repeated 5 times. It is perhaps surprising that nearly half the parents of children who have repeated several classes report they are satisfied with the teaching their child is receiving. This suggests that parents may not have very high expectations of the school system.

The education service is not considered one of the most corrupt public services. When asked which are the worst and best services for corruption, only 4% of households mentioned education as one of the worst, while 28% mentioned education as one of the least corrupt services.

Nevertheless, some focus groups mentioned corruption and other problems with the education service, particularly the UPE scheme. The proportions of focus groups mentioning different issues are shown in Annex 5, Table A5.1.

"UPE has been useless. Fees are almost the same in both government and private schools. In government schools children are too many. They do not study well. Children are sent away from school while they have not learnt anything. They [parents] pay money for their children in those government schools".
Focus group of women, Mbarara district

"Corruption has made UPE lose meaning".
Focus group of women, Katakwi district

"Teachers have lost morale. When parents go to school, teachers ask them if they will teach their children for free. They tell them to take their children to Museveni. If not money for coaching [is given to the teachers], [there is no adequate teaching".
Focus group of women, Mbarara district

Household experiences and perceptions of health, police, local administration, judiciary and revenue services

Households were asked about their last contact with a range of key services: health, police, local administration, judiciary and revenue (URA). In Kampala district they were also asked about contacts with Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), Uganda Post and Telecommunications Corporation (UPTC) and National Sewerage and Water Corporation (NSWC). Table 7 shows the number and percentage of households reporting contacts with the different services. Some households reported contacts with several of the services; 86% had contact with at least one of the services. The most frequently contacted service is health, followed by police and local administration. Less households reported contact with the judiciary or URA.

Table 7. Household contacts with different services

Service	Number of contacts (% of total contacts)
Health	9962 (60)
Police	2527 (17)
Local Administration	2168 (14)
Judiciary	708 (5)
URA	421 (3)
UEB (Kampala only)	163 (2)
UPTC (Kampala only)	37 (0.3)
NSWC (Kampala only)	23 (0.2)
Total contacts	16,009 (100)

For each service contact, households reported about several aspects of the service they received.

Reasons for contact and method of contact

In most cases (85%), the contact was initiated by the service user. The proportion of contacts initiated by the user is highest for health services (Table 8). Some of the contacts initiated by the service include arrests on suspicion of crime (some of the contacts initiated by the police).

Table 8. Initiation of contact with service

Service	No. (%) of contacts initiated by service users:
Health	9788 (99)
Police	1585 (63)
Local Adm	1434 (67)
Judiciary	389 (55)
URA	205 (49)

For each of the services, a range of reasons for the contact were reported. Table 9 shows the main reasons for service contacts. For health, the major reason for contact was sickness (86%), rather than any routine health care. For the police, more than a third of contacts did not have a clearly specificed reason. The commonest reason for contacting the police was theft/robbery (23%), followed by assault (20%). For local administration contacts, the commonest specified reason was about local taxation (24%). For contacts with the judiciary, the reason was not clearly specified in 50% of contacts, but again thef/robbery and assault were common reasons for contact. Nearly two thirds (60%) of contacts with the URA were about tax matters.

Table 9. Reasons for contact with services

Service & reasons	No. (%) of contacts
Health	
Sick	8525 (86)
Routine health care	506 (6)
Delivery	421 (4)
Antenatal care	302 (3)
Assault/accident	80 (1)
Other - unspecified	60 (1)
Police	
Theft/robbery	565 (23)
Assault	484 (20)
Accident	102 (4)
Sick	79 (3)
Domestic dispute	79 (3)
Other disputes	164 (7)
Traffic offence	39 (2)
Other -unspecified	964 (39)
Local Administration	
Theft/robbery	209 (10)
Assault/accident	198 (9)
Sick	173 (8)
Domestic dispute	96 (4)
Other disputes	76 (4)
About tax	519 (24)
Licencing/permits	104 (5)
Other - unspecified	765 (36)
Judiciary	
Theft/robbery	74 (11)
Assault/accident	70 (10)
Sick	117 (17)
Domestic dispute	23 (3)
Other disputes	59 (9)
Other - unspecified	348 ((50)
URA	
About tax	250 (60)
Licencing issues	114 (28)
Other - unspecified	50 (12)

Method of contacting the service

In nearly all cases (93%), the individual contacting the service went there in person (or was contacted in person). In 4% the initial contact was by letter and in 2% it was via a relative. There was little difference between services, except that for contacts with the judiciary the initial contact was less often in person (71%) and more often by letter (24%).

About one in five service users (21%) have help from a friend or relative within the service. This figure is similar for all the key services, although a little lower for dealings with the URA (15%).

Timing and number of staff seen

Of the service contacts reported, most (85%) had been completed at the time of the survey, with 15% still ongoing.

More than two thirds (69%) of service contacts require more than one day to complete dealings. More than half of contacts (57%) need more than two visits to complete dealing with the matter; and in a similar proportion (59%) the service user sees more than two different staff to deal with the matter. The timing and staff seen in contacts with the different services are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Service timing and number of staff seen

Service	No. (%) of contacts:		
	Taking >1 day	Making >2 visits	Seeing >2 staff
Health	6087 (66)	3678 (40)	5751 (60)
Police	1872 (83)	1329 (57)	1414 (59)
Local Adm	1235 (64)	721 (36)	1275 (62)
Judiciary	567 (91)	459 (73)	451 (69)
URA	186 (48)	84 (25)	206 (53)

As shown in Table 10, the 'quickest' service is the URA, with less than half of contacts

needing more than one day, while the 'slowest' is the judiciary, with nine out of ten contacts taking more than one day. This is also seen in the number of visits required: the least for URA where only a quarter of contacts need three or more visits, while three quarters of contacts with the judiciary need this number of visits. The highest number of staff are also seen for contacts with the judiciary, with more than two thirds of contacts involving three or more different staff.

Provision of information about the service

For most service contacts (70%), service users are given some sort of information about how to use the service. The information is spoken in 41%, written in 12% and both in 17%. More than half the information given (58%) is helpful, a quarter (25%) is 'somewhat helpful' and 16% is 'not helpful at all'. There is variation between the different service in the amount and helpfulness of information they give to service users. This is shown in Table 11.

Table 11. Information about the using the services

Service	No. (%) of contacts:	
	Given information	Information helpful
Health	7143 (73)	4851 (68)
Police	1649 (67)	621 (38)
Local Adm	1380 (66)	716 (53)
Judiciary	458 (68)	219 (48)
URA	268 (68)	126 (47)

Note: In Table 11, percentages in the third column are out of the numbers in the second column.

Health services do best both at giving information and that information being useful to service users. Police services give information about as often as other services, but it is rated as helpful in only about a third of cases (38%).

Complaining about the service

One safeguard for service users is an effective complaints system. In this survey, only a third of service users (32%) know how to complain about the service. And only one in seven (15%) of service users actually made a complaint about the service. This is despite quite high levels of dissatisfaction with the service (see below). The variation in knowledge about how to complain by type of service and in making a complaint is shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Knowledge about complaints and making complaints

Service	No. (%) of contacts:	
	Know how to complain	Made a complaint
Health	2639 (27)	1197 (12)
Police	923 (37)	463 (19)
Local Adm	988 (46)	437 (21)
Judiciary	273 (39)	153 (22)
URA	147 (36)	70 (17)

The best service for service users knowing how to complain is local administration, where nearly half the users know how to complain about the service. For health services, only a quarter (27%) know how to complain. The lowest proportion of complaints actually made is for health service contacts, at just over one in ten (12%); for the other services the complaint rate is about one in five contacts. These complaint rates should be seen in the light of the levels of dissatisfaction with the service speed and staff (see below).

Satisfaction with service speed and staff

Just over half of service users (55%) are satisfied with the speed of the service and the same proportion (55%) are satisfied with the behaviour of the service staff. The levels of satisfaction with the service vary between services, as shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Satisfaction with service speed and staff

Service	No. (%) of contacts:	
	Satisfied with speed	Satisfied with staff behaviour
Health	6503 (65)	6607 (67)
Police	895 (36)	844 (34)
Local Adm	1138 (53)	1115 (52)
Judiciary	253 (36)	292 (42)
URA	190 (46)	166 (40)

Health services are rated more positively for speed and staff behaviour than the others, with two thirds of the users being satisfied with both these aspects. The police rate worst: only a third of users are satisfied with speed and only a third are satisfied with staff behaviour. Comparing Tables 12 and 13, it is clear that many people are dissatisfied but do not actually make a complaint about the service. For the police, for example, two thirds of those who have contact are not satisfied but only one in five make a complaint. This may be because service users do not know how to complain (only a minority know how) or because they are concerned about what might happen to them if they complain (particularly about the police).

Use of brokers in dealings with services

A small proportion of service users (6%) use a broker to help them in their dealings with the service. The proportion using a broker is lower for health and local administration contacts than for contacts with the other services (Table 14). Table 14 also shows the mean payments made to the brokers: payments are notably higher for contacts with the judiciary.

Table 14. Use of brokers and payments to brokers

Service	No. (%) contacts using broker	Mean payment to broker (UgSh)
Health	289 (3)	4,909
Police	278 (12)	28,761
Local Adm	110 (5)	14,088
Judiciary	119 (18)	112,005
URA	45 (11)	28,798

Some of these payments to brokers may be legitimate; for example, a solicitor or barrister for contacts with the judiciary. But some are a form of corruption, where the broker is a go-between for unofficial payments from service users to service workers.

Payment of bribes to service workers

All services users were asked if they had made any extra payment(s) to service worker(s) in order to get the service. In other words, they were asked about payment of bribes.

> Four out of ten service users (40%) have to pay a bribe to workers in key public services in order to get a service.

The proportion of service users having to pay a bribe to get service varies between the services, as shown in Table 15. Table 15 also shows the mean and median amount of bribes paid to the different services.

Table 15. Payment of bribes to service workers

Service	No. (%) contacts paying a bribe	Amount paid (UgSh)	
		Mean	Median
Health	2644 (28)	11,998	3,500
Police	1511 (63)	50,453	20,000
Local Adm	806 (39)	15,322	5,000
Judiciary	326 (50)	106,542	50,000
URA	159 (40)	71,896	30,000

The services where bribery is most common

are the police and judiciary, with two thirds of users paying a bribe to the workers in the police and half of users paying a bribe to workers in the judiciary services. The highest mean amounts of bribes are for contacts with the judiciary. Health services have less bribery (although still more than a quarter of contacts involve a bribe) and the average amounts paid are less.

In focus groups, people spoke strongly about their feelings of anger and frustration at having to pay bribes. They mentioned the police and health services particularly (see Annex 5). Mention of the police seems likely to be related to the high proportion of contacts where a bribe is paid. For the health services, the total number of bribes paid is higher because the number of contacts with the service is higher (see Table 7), even though the proportion of contacts where a bribe is paid is lower.

"Police in this area are too rotten - they will squeeze us until we are left as bones"
Focus group of men, Mbale district

"Even to remove the dead body one has to pay money.
The health workers here like dead people more than the alive, because it seems it is now business".
Focus group of men, Mukono district

Nearly all (92%) of the payments to service workers are said to have been requested by the worker, rather than offered spontaneously. This does not vary much between services. It may be that service users who offered a payment spontaneously are not willing to admit to this; thus the total number of bribes paid may actually be even higher than reported here.

People who did not pay a bribe were asked if they had been asked for a payment they refused or if they had offered a payment that was refused by the service worker concerned. Many people did not answer these two questions. Among those who did answer, up to a quarter (25%) reported being asked for a bribe that they refused to pay but less than 2% admitted to offering a bribe that was refused by the worker. These figures have to be interpreted with caution because the people who did not answer may be less likely to have refused to pay or to have offered a bribe.

Factors associated with the rate of paying a bribe

It is important to understand the circumstances where payment of bribes occurs. This can help when considering what interventions might reduce the risk of paying bribes. This section describes an analysis of those factors that are associated with an increased rate of paying a bribe to a service worker. Firstly, as already shown above (Table 15), payment of a bribe is more common in contacts with some services than others. More bribes are paid to the police than to health workers. Therefore, any other factors that seem to change the risk of paying a bribe must be considered in light of this different rate of paying a bribe between services.

In the following analysis, the effect of each variable on the rate of paying a bribe is first considered separately (univariate analysis). The rate of paying a bribe in one situation compared with another is given as the Relative Risk, which is here measured by means of the Odds Ratio. The effects of all the variables that separately affect the rate of paying a bribe are then considered together in a multiple logistic regression. This calculates the effect of a particular variable taking the effects of all the others into account. It is a way of showing the possible effects on the levels of bribery of changing different variables.

Sex of the service user

Men using services have a higher rate of paying a bribe than women using services (Table 16). The relative risk of a man paying a bribe compared with a woman is more than one and a half times (1.67).

Table 16. Sex of service user and payment of a bribe

Sex of service user	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
Male (%)	3378 (43)	4568 (57)
Female (%)	1984 (31)	4487 (69)
	Odds ratio=1.67 (95%CI 1.56-1.79)	

The effect of sex of the service user is still found when the effect of the type of service (health, police etc) is taken into account by stratification, although it is a little less marked. Part of the apparent association with sex of the service user is because more men have contacts with the police and more contacts with the police involve paying a bribe.

Who makes the initial contact

When the service initiates the contact, rather than the service user, then the rate of paying a bribe is higher. Service users contacted by the service have more than twice the rate of paying a bribe compared with service users who initiate the contact themselves. This is shown in Table 17. When type of service is taken into account by stratification, the increased rate when the service makes the contact is found to be particularly marked for contacts with the police.

Table 17. Initiation of service contact and payment of a bribe

Contact initiated by	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
Service (%)	1210 (54)	1043 (46)
User (%)	4298 (34)	8526 (66)
	Odds ratio=2.33 (95%CI 2.08-2.50)	

This association probably reflects the practice (especially in contacts with the police) of seeking bribes from arrested persons, or even harassing people with the deliberate aim of being given a bribe to stop the harassment. Certainly, these issues were raised frequently in focus group discussions.

"The traffic police on the roadside are not law keepers, but are like 'tax collectors' since every time they ask for payment from people with vehicles".
Focus group of women, Mbarara district

A man's brother was accused of theft and arrested by the police. He was asked to pay 80,000/= so that he could be released, but the one who accused him paid more money and he stayed in jail for 5 months and was again told to pay 100,000/= for his release. The brother had to sell his bicycle and radio. "All policemen are corrupt and inhuman and they only mind about those who have money"
Focus group of men, Luwero district

Time to complete dealings with the service

About a third of users complete their dealings with the services within one day. Those whose dealings with the service take more than one day to complete have twice the rate of paying a bribe compared to those whose business is completed more quickly. This is shown in Table 18.

Table 18. Time to complete dealings with service and payment of a bribe

Time to complete dealings	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
More than 1 day (%)	3918 (41)	5705 (59)
Up to 1 day (%)	1083 (25)	3217 (75)
	Odds ratio=2.04 (95%CI 1.89-2.22)	

The relationship between time to complete dealings and the rate of paying a bribe

remains the same when the type of service (health, police etc) is taken into account by stratification.

It may be that more complex issues take longer to deal with and are also more likely to attract bribes. But there is certainly no suggestion in this survey that paying a bribe expedites dealings with the services; quite the reverse seems to be the case.

Number of visits to the service

Just over half of service users (57%) complete their dealings with the service in one or two visits. Those who need more than two visits to complete their dealing with the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe. This is shown in Table 19.

Table 19. Number of visits to service and payment of a bribe

Number of visits	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
More than 2 (%)	2747 (46)	3293 (54)
Up to 2 (%)	2315 (29)	5588 (71)
	Odds ratio=2.0 (95%CI 1.88-2.17)	

This relationship is unchanged when the type of service (health, police etc) is taken into account by stratification.

Again, although the greater number of visits may reflect more complex problems, there is no hint that paying a bribe secures a quicker service, with less repeat visits. It seems to be that more visits present more opportunities for service workers to extract payments. Focus groups suggested that services may keep you coming back and forth until you finally pay a bribe, or several bribes.

"I went to the magistrate's court; I had a case with someone who had killed my cow. Every time I was taking money to court. The Magistrate used to ask me if I had brought something".
Focus group of men, Mbarara district

Number of staff seen

Over half over service users (59%) see three or more staff in their dealings with the service. Those who see more than two service staff have a higher rate of paying a bribe than those who see only one or two staff. This is shown in Table 20.

Table 20. Number of staff seen and payment of a bribe

Number of staff seen	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
More than 2 (%)	3453 (39)	5302 (61)
Up to 2 (%)	1792 (31)	3932 (69)
	Odds ratio=1.42 (95%CI 1.33-1.54)	

This association between seeing more staff and the rate of paying a bribe is still found when the type of service (health, police etc) is taken into account by stratification.

This finding of more risk of paying a bribe when more different staff are seen suggests that service users may be passed along until they pay a bribe, or that they risk being asked for a bribe by each of the workers they see. Therefore if they see more workers this means they have a higher overall risk of having to pay a bribe. Thus a bureaucracy that requires people to see a number of different staff in order to finish their business is conducive to corruption. There is again no suggestion here that paying a bribe simplifies dealings with a service; it does not seem that paying the first worker means that they complete the dealings for the service user without the need to see other staff.

This tendency of seeing multiple staff and having to pay each one is well recognised by the participants of the focus groups.

"The more people you see, the higher the temptation to pay a bribe." (young man)
Focus group of men, Mbale district

"There is a chain of corruption in the whole service system. e.g. if a person wants to extract money from a complainant, when the complainant reports to the higher authorities, they also want money".
Focus group of men, Kiboga district

"In courts of law, winning a case depends on whether one has money or not. Right from the messenger, you have to oil the whole system".
Focus group of women, Tororo district

Information about how to use the service
As described above, 70% of service users receive information about how to use the service and 58% of these find the information helpful. There is little effect of simply receiving information on the rate of paying a bribe. However, when those given information *that is helpful* are compared with those not given information or only given unhelpful information, a different picture emerges. Service users who are not given helpful information about how to use the service have twice the rate of paying a bribe compared to those who are given helpful information. This is shown in Table 21.

Table 21. Information about using the service and payment of a bribe

Information about the service	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
None/not helpful (%)	3681 (43)	4803 (57)
Helpful (%)	1641 (27)	4511 (73)
	Odds ratio=2.13 (95%CI 1.96-2.27)	

The relationship between helpful information about the service and the risk of paying a bribe is still present after the effect of type of service (health, police etc) is taken into account by stratification.

This relationship between information about the service and reduced risk of paying a bribe may mean that better informed service users who know their rights are less prey to demands for bribes. It may also be that those service providers who bother to give people information about how to use the service are also more organised and efficient and have better staff supervision etc.

Time since the service contact
More than four out of five (83%) of the reported service contacts took place within the 12 months preceding the survey. Rather less of the contacts with the judiciary (57%) took place within one year of the survey.

When the service contact was more than one year ago, service users report paying bribes more often. The rate of paying a bribe in a service contact more than a year before the survey is nearly one and a half times compared with contacts a year ago or less. This is shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Time since the service contact and payment of a bribe

Timing of service contact	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
>1 year ago (%)	1131 (44)	1439 (56)
Up to 1 year ago (%)	4184 (35)	7834 (65)
	Odds ratio=1.47 (95%CI 1.35-1.61)	

The higher risk of paying a bribe in less recent contacts is found for all the services except the police, where there is actually a slightly higher risk of paying a bribe in more recent contacts.

This finding of more bribes for service contacts longer than one year ago is mildly encouraging, since it implies that matters are getting better rather than worse over the last

few years. But there may also be an element of recall bias - those contacts some time ago when a bribe had to be paid may be more likely to be remembered than if a bribe did not have to be paid.

Urban and rural sites

About 15% of the service contacts are reported from households in urban sites. Service contacts from households in urban sites have a higher rate of paying a bribe. The risk of paying a bribe for service users in urban sites is nearly one and a half times compared with users in rural sites (Table 23).

Table 23. Area of residence and payment of a bribe

Area of residence	Payment of a bribe	
	Paid	Did not pay
Urban (%)	1011 (43)	1317 (57)
Rural (%)	4522 (35)	8282 (65)
	Odds ratio=1.41 (95%CI 1.28-1.54)	

This same effect of residence area was found for contacts with all the different services separately, except for the judiciary where bribes were equally likely in urban and rural sites.

Paying bribes and satisfaction with service

Those people who paid a bribe in their contact with the service are less satisfied with the service they received, in terms of both the speed of the service and the behaviour of the staff. Table 24 shows the relationship between paying a bribe and dissatisfaction with the service speed and with the staff behaviour.

Table 24. Payment of a bribe and dissatisfaction with the service speed and staff behaviour

Payment of a bribe	Satisfaction with service speed	
	Not satisfied	Satisfied
Paid (%)	3472 (63)	2044 (37)
Did not pay (%)	3094 (32)	6484 (68)
	Odds ratio=3.56 (95%CI 3.32-3.82)	

Payment of a bribe	Satisfaction with staff behaviour	
	Not satisfied	Satisfied
Paid (%)	3657 (66)	1861 (34)
Did not pay (%)	2881 (30)	6706 (70)
	Odds ratio=4.57 (95%CI 4.26-4.92)	

Service users who pay a bribe have more than three times the rate of being dissatisfied with the service speed and more than four times the rate of being dissatisfied with the staff behaviour. This suggests either that after paying a bribe they expect a superior service and are disappointed if this does not happen or, more likely, that they resent being forced to pay for a service they believe should be without charge. Their dissatisfaction with the service speed accords with the finding that paying a bribe is related to a slower service (see Table 18).

Paying bribes and complaining about the service

Service users who pay a bribe, although less satisfied with the service, are not more likely to make a complaint about the service. This may be because they do not know how to make a complaint, or because they choose not to. They may choose not to complain because they think it is not worthwhile or because they fear the consequences for their subsequent contacts with the service.

Effect of variables in combination on risk of bribes

The combined effects of the different variables found to affect the rate of paying a bribe have been examined in a multiple logistic regression analysis. The variables entered into the logistic regression initial model are shown in table 25. The relationship between paying a bribe and dissatisfaction with the service has not been included, since in this case it is the bribe that comes first, rather than dissatisfaction increasing the rate of paying a bribe.

Table 25. Variables affecting the risk of paying a bribe when considered separately

Variable	Increased risk with:	Relative risk (95% CI)
Sex of user	Males	1.67 (1.56-1.79)
Initial contact	By the service	2.33 (2.08-2.50)
Time to complete	More than 1 day	2.04 (1.89-2.22)
Number of visits	More than two	2.0 (1.88-2.17)
Number of staff seen	More than two	1.42 (1.33-1.54)
Information given	None/unhelpful	2.13 (1.96-2.27)
Time since contact	More than 1 year	1.47 (1.35-1.61)
Area of residence	Urban dwelling	1.41 (1.28-1.54)

After undertaking the logistic regression (step down from a saturated model to find the best fitting, most parsimonious model) all eight of the variables remain in the model. That is, they all have effects on the rate of paying a bribe, even when the effects of all the others are taken into account simultaneously. The adjusted risk estimates from the final model are shown in Table 26.

Table 26. Adjusted risk estimates for variables affecting the risk of paying a bribe, from logistic regression

Variable /risk	Relative risk (95% CI)	Risk difference (95% CI)
Male user	1.17 (1.12-1.22)	3.70% (1.87-5.52)
Contact by service	1.40 (1.32-1.49)	7.87% (5.26-10.48)
>1 day to complete	1.23 (1.17-1.30)	4.90% (2.93-6.87)
>2 visits	1.31 (1.25-1.37)	6.34% (4.52-8.17)
>2 staff seen	1.11 (1.07-1.16)	2.53% (0.67-4.39)
No helpful information	1.37 (1.31-1.43)	7.35% (5.54-9.16)
>1 yr since contact	1.08 (1.02-1.14)	1.78% (-0.61-4.17)
Urban dwelling	1.18 (1.12-1.25)	4.01% (1.46-6.56)

Pointers for action to reduce the rate of paying bribes

Both relative risk and risk difference (see Table 26) give an indication of the potential benefits of intervening to change those variables that affect the rate of paying a bribe and are amenable to change. The relative risk indicates how much the risk for individuals could be reduced, while the risk difference indicates how many people could be protected in the population.

It is striking in this combined analysis (as well as in the separate analyses) that clearly bribes do **not** buy a better service. Service users who pay bribes experience a slower service, see more staff and make more visits to have their business completed. Apparently the delays, multiple visits and multiple staff contacts simply present more opportunities for service workers to extract money from service users. This process can more accurately be described as extortion than bribery. In bribery, the briber usually expects to get some benefit as a result of the payment: there is no evidence of that in this survey. Publicising the lack of benefit to

service users who pay bribes may in itself contribute to reducing this pervasive form of corruption in public services.

Table 27 summaries the potential reduction in the burden of paying bribes that could be achieved if interventions could be implemented and succeed in changing different risk factors.

The first three of the interventions in Table 27 that could help to reduce the risk of service users having to pay bribes are all closely related. They are all associated with bureaucracy in the provision of the service, whereby users have to see multiple staff, make multiple visits and spend much time on completing their business. This clearly adds to the opportunities for corruption.

The possible benefits of giving service users helpful information about how to use the service are encouraging as this could be a relatively straightforward intervention that could be put into place quickly. A policy of all services having to provide a certain amount of basic information to users could be implemented with strong leadership at national and district level and could be expected to help reduce the level of bribery in these key public services.

Action to address the problem would affect all three of the identified risk factors. The total effect of action to reduce bureaucracy would be increased because it could reduce all three of the identified risk factors.

Table 27. Possible benefits of different interventions to reduce the risk of paying bribes for key public services

Intervention	Potential individual benefit (from OR)	Potential population benefit (from RD)	Proptn of population who could benefit
Ensure business is completed speedily	23% reduction in risk of paying bribes	5% less users paying bribes	7 out of 10 service users
Ensure less than two visits are needed	31% reduction in risk of paying bribes	6% less users paying bribes	4 out of 10 service users
Ensure less than two staff are seen	11% reduction in risk of paying bribes	3% less users paying bribes	6 out of 10 service users
Ensure service users are given helpful information	37% reduction in risk of paying bribes	7% less users paying bribes	6 out of 10 service users

Note: The proportion of the population who could benefit is that proportion not currently having the favourable level of the variable. For example, the proportion of service users not currently receiving helpful information about how to use the service.

VIEWS ABOUT CORRUPTION FROM HOUSEHOLDS AND SERVICE WORKERS

All households in the survey were asked for their views about corruption in public services, especially the public services they experience in their own district. Service workers in the key services (education, health, police, local administration, judiciary and URA) were also asked about their views in a short individual questionnaire (see Annex 2).

Views about the practice of paying bribes

In an open question, households gave their opinion of the practice of paying bribes to service workers in order to get a service or a favour. Their responses are shown in Table 28. Most of the respondents think that the practice is bad and some give more specific reasons why it is bad. Only a small minority think that there is a good side to the practice. Up to three answers per respondent were included.

Table 28. Household views about the practice of paying bribes to service workers

View	No. (%) households:
It is bad	14126 (77)
It is unfair/poor people suffer	3247 (18)
Causes bad relations/divides people	540 (3)
It's inevitable/everyone does it	131 (1)
It's OK/makes the service work	1202 (7)
Bad image/inefficient service	1100 (6)
Don't know	512 (3)
No answer	1057 (6)

Service workers were asked a similar question about what effect corruption in public services has on the delivery of the service to the public. Their responses are shown in Table 29. Up to three responses per person were recorded.

Table 29. Service workers views about the effect of corruption on delivery of services to the public

View	No. (%) workers:
Bad service, especially for poor people	725 (46)
Inefficient services	357 (22)
Loss of morality/bad relations	417 (26)
Deters development	259 (16)
People don't use services	123 (8)
Loss of job	19 (1)
No effect/little effect	23 (1)
Don't know	8 (1)
No answer	114 (7)

Similar to the households, the big majority of service workers describe negative effects of corruption on the delivery of public services. Very few claim that there is little or no effect.

Perceptions about forms of corruption

Households were asked what forms of corruption they knew of in their district. Their responses are shown in Table 30. Up to three responses per household were recorded.

Table 30. Household knowledge about forms of corruption

Form of corruption known	No. (%) households:
Bribery	13118 (71)
Embezzlement	4012 (22)
Fraud	522 (3)
Nepotism/tribalism	3407 (19)
Misuse official vehicles/equipment	392 (2)
Neglect of duty	879 (5)
Diversion of funds	494 (3)
Don't know	1454 (8)
No answer	1490 (8)

The common forms of corruption known to households are bribery, embezzlement and nepotism/tribalism.

Perception of corruption in different services

Households were asked about which service they rated as the worst (most corrupt) and which they rated as the best (least corrupt). Their responses are shown in Tables 31 and 32.

Table 31. Services rated as most corrupt by households

Service	No. (%) households:
Police	11041 (60)
Judiciary	2760 (15)
Health	4983 (27)
URA	1164 (6)
Education	795 (4)
Local administration	4631 (25)
Works	157 (1)
Tender boards	3 (0)
IGG	3 (0)
Post office	15 (0.1)
UEB	322 (2)
Agriculture	399 (2)
Water	62 (0.3)
All are non-corrupt	8 (0)
All are corrupt	354 (2)
Don't know	1529 (8)
No answer	886 (5)

Note: Up to three responses per household were recorded.

Comparison of Tables 31 and 32 shows that education is rarely rated as one of the most corrupt services and quite often rated as one of the least corrupt services. On the other hand, nearly two thirds of households rate the police as one of the most corrupt services and only 2% rate the police as one of the least corrupt services. As shown in Table 32, 9% of households explicitly state that they think all public services are corrupt. But also quite high proportions say they don't know which are least corrupt or cannot answer this question. This implies that many households cannot identify public service they think are not corrupt.

Table 32. Services rated as least corrupt by households

Service	No. (%) households:
Police	380 (2)
Judiciary	311 (2)
Health	3423 (17)
URA	284 (2)
Education	5106 (28)
Local administration	2750 (15)
Works	105 (1)
IGG	2 (0)
Media	3 (0)
Post office	167 (1)
UEB	91 (0.5)
Agriculture	1853 (10)
Water	266 (1)
All are non-corrupt	7 (0)
All are corrupt	1559 (9)
Don't know	2735 (15)
No answer	2017 (11)

Note: Up to three responses per household were recorded.

Perceptions of level of corruption and changes in level in recent years

Both households and service workers were asked how much corruption they thought there was in public services. Their responses are shown in Table 33.

Table 33. Perceptions of level of corruption in public services

Level of corruption	No. (%) households	No. (%) service workers
Very much	12038 (70)	571 (37)
Somewhat	4464 (26)	865 (56)
None at all	628 (4)	108 (7)

It is clear that households perceive a higher level of corruption in public service than do service workers. This difference in perception between the public and service workers is important to address as part of efforts to tackle corruption.

Households and service workers were also asked whether they think the problem of corruption is getting better or worse over the last two years (roughly since the new constitution). Their views are shown in Table 34.

Table 34. Perceptions of change in level of corruption over the last two years

Change in corruption	No. (%) households	No. (%) service workers
Better	3140 (19)	527 (36)
The same	4164 (25)	473 (32)
Worse	9693 (57)	475 (32)

Again, service workers take a more positive view than households. More than half of households think the problem of corruption has got worse in the last two years and only one in five think it has got better. For service workers, there is an even spread in opinion between the situation being better, the same or worse. Despite this rather negative view of progress against corruption, the finding of a lower risk of paying bribes for service contacts in the last year (see Table 22) is perhaps more encouraging (although this could be partly due to recall bias rather than a real effect).

The focus group discussions generally give the impression that people feel the problem of corruption is certainly not getting better and may be getting worse.

"In fact, this a common, daily and open practice, so that we think government has legalised payment of bribes in the country". (Elderly lady)
Focus group of women, Mbale district

"The health workers here like dead people more than the alive, because it seems it is now business".
Focus group of men, Mukono district

Perceptions of service workers about what constitutes corruption

In individual interviews, the ideas of service workers about what is or is not corruption were explored (see Annex 2 for details of the questionnaire).

First, interviewees were read a scenario about a service worker who regularly requests bribes from members of the public and asked what they thought about this. Their reactions are shown in Table 35.

Table 35. Service workers views about a worker who regularly requests bribes from the public

View	No. (%) workers:
Behaviour is desirable	76 (5)
Behaviour is harmful	1483 (93)
Behaviour is justifiable	262 (17)
Behaviour is corrupt	1495 (94)

Note that as many as 17% think this behaviour is justifiable, even though 94% agree it is corrupt. When asked what they would do about it, by far the commonest response (84%) is that they would 'talk to the colleague about it'. Only 6% say they would report the colleague for this behaviour.

Interviewees were then read a series of

statements and asked if they agreed with each one. Their answers are shown in Table 36.

Table 36. Service workers views about corruption and related issues

Statement	No. (%) who agree:
Only conduct that is illegal can be called corrupt	1017 (64)
It is sometimes justifiable to avoid procedures in order to get past bureaucracy	539 (34)
If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt	905 (57)
The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it	244 (15)
You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it	212 (13)
There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business	680 (43)
There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it	247 (16)
People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it	731 (46)
Most corruption is too minor to be worth reporting	324 (20)
I would not know where to go to report corruption	399 (25)
It is not my business to report corruption	174 (11)
People who report corruption are just troublemakers	138 (9)

There are a number of issues for concern in these responses. More than half the service workers think that if something is done 'for the right reasons' it is not corrupt. The 'right reasons' could include that the person concerned needs the money to keep his family. Nearly half the workers think that gifts from private companies to public sector employees are quite alright. It is startling that nearly half of those interviewed think that people reporting corruption are likely to suffer for it. This does not suggest they will be keen to report corruption themselves.

And in any case, a quarter of them claim they would not know to go to report, one in ten think it is not their business to report and one in ten even think that those who report corruption are just troublemakers.

It seems there is some way to go in changing the attitudes of service workers towards corruption. Not only do they currently perceive a lower rate of corruption in services than do their service users, but they also hold some views about what constitutes corruption that may lead them into actions most people would consider to be corrupt.

AWARENESS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE IGG

All households were asked if they had heard of the IGG and, if so, what they think the IGG does. They were further asked if they had ever made a report to the IGG and, if so, how they rated the service they received from the IGG.

Overall, about a third (32%) of households have heard of the IGG. However, this figure varies quite a bit in different areas of the country, as shown in Annex 6. The proportion who have heard of the IGG varies from 6% in Kisoro and 8% in Adjumani and Moyo to 69% in Kampala.

Of those who have heard of the IGG, relatively few know about what the IGG does. Their ideas about what the IGG does are shown in Table 37. About a third know that the IGG investigates allegations of corruption but half cannot say what the IGG does.

Table 37. Knowledge about IGG activities among households who have heard of the IGG

Activity	No. (%) households:
Investigates allegations of corruption	1780 (37)
Educates the public	38 (1)
Stops corruption	242 (5)
Encourages corruption	9 (0.2)
Advises, empowers people	423 (9)
Nothing useful	11 (0.2)
Don't know/not able to answer	2371 (50)

Only 77 households among all the 18,412 report having made a complaint to the IGG. Just under half to them are satisfied with the way their complaint was dealt with by the IGG.

It seems there is a lot of work still to be done to bring the activities of the IGG in tackling corruption to the attention of the majority of people in Uganda. Some people in focus groups were openly sceptical about the role of the IGG.

"The IGG has never convicted anyone of corruption"
Focus group of men, Luwero district

VIEWS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF CORRUPTION AND SOLUTIONS FOR CORRUPTION

Causes of corruption

Ideas about causes of corruption were explored in the focus group discussions. The suggested causes from the focus groups are shown in Annex 5, Table A5.1. The causes most often cited in the focus groups are low salaries and salaries not paid reliably (76% male groups and 78% of female groups) and greed on the part of the service workers (42% of male groups and 46% of female groups). Other causes mentioned are poor example from the top, poor supervision, lack of public knowledge about their rights, lack of punishment of corrupt people, lack of job security, and getting a better service by paying. This last reason was mentioned by less than one in ten of the focus groups and is not borne out by the facts in this survey (see above).

"Public servants are corrupt because of greed for money, insecurity of tenure due rampant retrenchment and the need to get rich very quickly".
Focus group of men, Tororo district

"We are not paid salaries, when I come across someone who can give me money, I just receive it".
Focus group of men, Bundibugyo district

"Naturally, I do what my father does, and government is the father; that is why most people are following suit". (laughing)
Focus group of men, Mbale district

"The government is the source of corruption. It is a lie to say that government wants to eradicate corruption. How can you remove your own eye because it led you into a sin?".
Focus group of women, Nebbi district

Key informants in each community were asked about special projects in the community and whether they think that donors for projects like these make the problem of corruption better or worse. Unfortunately, most of the key informants found these questions difficult to answer. Only 45 (out of 178 key informants) were able to comment about the role of donors: 34 of them think the donors make the situation better and 11 think they make it worse.

Solutions for corruption

Households and service workers were asked what action they think could be taken to tackle the problem of corruption at three levels: national government, local government and communities themselves. Their suggestions for actions at the three levels are shown in Tables 38, 39 and 40.

Table 38. Suggestions for action by central government to tackle the problem of corruption

Action	No. (%) households	No. (%) service workers
Sack/discipline corrupt workers	7039 (38)	297 (19)
Prosecution	4589 (25)	278 (17)
Better pay & conditions	3555 (19)	898 (56)
Training & supervision	3001 (16)	326 (20)
Investigate allegations	1689 (9)	298 (19)
Educate the public	1321 (7)	235 (15)
Strong laws	1156 (6)	106 (7)
Government must act	1158 (6)	112 (7)
Encourage reporting	105 (0.6)	19 (1)
Improve economy	95 (0.5)	23 (1)
Nothing to do	121 (0.7)	2 (0.1)
Don't know	1266 (7)	5 (0.3)
Missing	1135 (6)	35 (2)

Note: Up to three answers were recorded

For actions by central government service workers and households suggest the same sorts of actions (Table 38). But service workers are less ready to suggest sacking and disciplining corrupt workers and more ready to suggest improving pay and conditions. Nevertheless, enforcement actions rate highly for both groups.

The actions suggested for local government (Table 39) are very much the same as those suggested for central government. Again, service workers are somewhat less keen on sacking and prosecution and more keen on improved pay and conditions.

Table 39. Suggestions for action by local government to tackle the problem of corruption

Action	No. (%) households	No. (%) service workers
Sack/discipline corrupt workers	5590 (30)	253 (16)
Prosecution	3768 (21)	219 (14)
Better pay & conditions	1791 (10)	597 (38)
Training & supervision	3807 (21)	486 (31)
Investigate allegations	1356 (7)	233 (15)
Educate the public	1873 (10)	323 (20)
Strong laws	807 (4)	59 (4)
Government must act	879 (5)	111 (7)
Encourage reporting	727 (4)	24 (2)
Improve economy	46 (0.2)	16 (1)
Nothing to do	201 (1)	8 (0.5)
Don't know	1588 (9)	16 (1)
Missing	1629 (9)	82 (5)

Note: Up to three answers were recorded

Table 40 shows the suggestions for actions by communities themselves. These are a little different from the suggestions at the two levels of government. Interestingly, the service workers are more keen than the households to suggest that the communities should report cases of corruption. In general the suggestions from service workers and households are quite similar for actions at community level.

Table 40. Suggestions for action by communities to tackle the problem of corruption

Action	No. (%) households	No. (%) service workers
Report corruption	8739 (48)	1146 (72)
Refuse to pay bribes	2797 (15)	374 (23)
Educate themselves	1287 (7)	226 (14)
Community meetings	884 (5)	111 (7)
Don't vote for corrupt people	866 (5)	44 (3)
Demonstrate & punish corrupt	839 (5)	32 (2)
Empower community	701 (4)	70 (4)
Elect women representatives	71 (0.4)	1 (0.1)
Can do nothing	859 (5)	29 (2)
Don't know	1442 (8)	2 (0.1)
Missing	2544 (14)	96 (6)

Note: Up to three answers were recorded

These suggestions for action from households and service workers can be supplemented by some of the possible actions that emerged in the earlier analysis about the risk of paying bribes. On the basis of that analysis, actions likely to be effective include providing information to service users (provided it is helpful information) and reducing the bureaucracy in the service so that users see fewer different staff and can have their business completed in less visits.

CONCLUSIONS

This survey has shown the range and depth of the problem of corruption in key public services in Uganda. There are variations between services, with the police being generally the worst from the point of view of service users being forced to pay bribes.

A very striking finding it is that service workers who pay bribes do not get a better service than those who do not. On the contrary, they take longer to have their business completed, see more staff and pay more visits to the service. Although this may be partly because they are more complex issues than those that do not require bribing the service workers, it nevertheless gives no evidence at all for the common belief that paying a bribe secures a better service. In this case, nearly all the payments are said to have been at the request of the workers and could more properly be called extortion than bribery.

A risk analysis of the factors affecting the risk of paying bribes indicates possible actions that could help to tackle the problem. Reduction of service bureaucracy so as to reduce the number of visits and the number of staff seen it is one action that could have good effect. Another it is the provision of information to service users about how to use the services.

Households think there it is a lot of corruption in public services, backed up by stories about experiences given in the focus groups. Service workers perceive less corruption. It is also of concern that some service workers do not perceive as corrupt actions that many people do consider to be corrupt. The belief that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it may sometimes be well founded; it is likely to deter service workers from reporting corruption.

Households and service workers suggest similar actions by central and local government to curb corruption, with some difference of emphasis. There it is a strong inclination towards enforcement actions. At community level, both households and service workers agree that reporting corruption and refusing to pay bribes are important actions.

This survey not only provides a baseline for judging the effects of actions to curb corruption in public services, it also provides pointers about which actions might be most effective in the fight against this pervasive evil.

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