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***Perceptions of the population concerning
corruption in public services***

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POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES

KEY FINDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL INTEGRITY SURVEY IN BOLIVIA, 1998

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Acknowledgements

The success of this first national integrity survey is entirely due to the 6,851 household respondents who, with anger and courage, had the confidence to share their opinions on corruption, in the hope that their voice would reduce this social ill in their country.

The results of the preliminary analysis were taken back to the communities, where 49 focus groups discussed them at length, deciding how best to approach corruption in their community. The 258 service workers participated in a spirit of change, knowing that their own voice echoed the strong opinions of the communities.

The 11 supervisors and 84 interviewers believed sufficiently in the importance of the Integrity Survey to do their work with diligence and professionalism.

The Survey would not have been possible without the collaboration of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística which selected the sample, provided logistical support, contacts with candidate interviewers, computers and data entry specialists.

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS: THE COMMUNITY VOICE IN THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

In January and February 1998, 6,851 households were contacted to learn their views on corruption in the public services.

One in three households had some contact with the services in the previous months, mostly with the police. Three out of four households saw corruption in the public services as severe or very severe. *According to the communities, the police service is most in need of reform regarding corruption.*

To reduce corruption in the police, they proposed better supervision, personnel changes with better training, and improved salaries. In the rural areas they suggested election of the local heads of police stations, obliging them to work with the other local authorities.

One in every four people had to pay a bribe (“bribe”) in the course of their most recent official transaction -- activities like obtaining a birth certificate, paying rates or taxes. One in four also employed an intermediary (“intermediary”) in order to make the transaction successful. Someone who used an intermediary was, paradoxically, also more likely to have to pay a bribe than someone in the same place who did not hire an intermediary.

Someone who used the services of a lawyer was also more likely to have to attend more often. In part, this is explained by the fact that more serious legal issues are more likely to require professional legal support. But there is also an indication that the lawyers are part of the petty corruption in the administrative and legal services: someone who used the services of a lawyer was more likely to have to pay a bribe than someone who did not. This effect was more pronounced in the rural areas.

Some 69% of people said they received little orientation or information on how to go about their transactions. Those who did receive orientation were marginally better off, particularly in relation to the time taken. The implication is that not only is it necessary to extend the process of orientation, it is also necessary to look closely at the contents, to optimise what is passed on to the communities. There were strong opinions expressed by participants on what it is they need to know (Box 2).

Box 1

A growth industry: petty corruption, lawyers and administrative intermediaries

People who used lawyers were more likely to have to bribe

Those who used lawyers also took longer to resolve their transaction

Those who used an intermediary were more likely to have to bribe

Those who received orientation (information) spent less time in their transactions

Those who had to bribe also had to spend more time on their transactions

Box 2

The orientation or information needed from public services

Requirements for each transaction
How much should it cost
How long should it take
Where should it be done
Complaints box

INTRODUCTION

The National Dialogue on "Bolivia hacia el siglo XXI" ¹ established a consensus that the struggle against corruption would require four types of intervention. These include advocacy and mobilisation of the institutions of civil society; the maintenance of consistent policies governing political processes; the moralization of institutions intended to combat corruption and an up-to-date and efficient juridical process.

The battle against corruption requires changes at individual and institutional levels. The national campaign therefore established a process that included seminars, workshops and round tables to hear the opinions of civil society. The views of civil society of the public service institutions not only provide markers of how the government is doing in its reform effort. They also help to identify where first to focus attention and what actions to take.

The Office of the Vice President has taken the lead in promoting a National Integrity Programme. It requested support from the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank, to develop a baseline integrity survey on which progress of the national programme could be benchmarked. The present project was initiated with the following objectives:

1. Know the perception of the Bolivian people regarding corruption in the public services, identifying areas they see as priority.
2. Quantify the problem of corruption in each of the main areas identified, identifying what the State needs to do in order to take corrective measures.
3. Identify specific solutions and terms on which communities can engage in reforms that can reduce corruption.
4. Establish a number of indicators and a baseline that will allow planning and evaluation progress in dealing with corruption.

In collaboration with the Office of National Integrity in the Vice Presidency, CIET was requested to carry out the first national integrity survey in Bolivia.

II. METHODS

Service delivery and national integrity surveys

Service delivery surveys were originally conceived in the mid 1980s as a mechanism for building national capacities while producing detailed reliable data at low cost. ^{2,3}

¹Diálogo Nacional "Bolivia Hacia el Siglo XXI", the Paz, Bolivia, octubre de 1997.

²Andersson N. Impact, Coverage and Costs: An operational framework for monitoring child survival emerging from two UNICEF projects in Central America. September. 1985

³Ledogar RJ & Andersson N. Impact Estimation Through Sentinel Community Surveillance: an affordable epidemiological approach. Third World Planning Review 1993;15/3:263-272.

The present integrity survey adapts modern research methods to obtain evidence of petty corruption, while involving local stakeholders in the process. Rooted in modern epidemiology, opinion polls and participatory research methods, the cross-design used for these integrity surveys have been used by CIET in several other settings including health, education⁴, water and sanitation⁵, land mines⁶ and economic sanctions⁷. As a service delivery survey, the techniques have been used to measure impact, coverage and costs in the sphere of environment⁸, urban transport⁹, agricultural extension¹⁰, health care¹¹ and justice¹².

The CIET integrity surveys typically follow tightly focussed process. After a review of existing data, there is a careful selection of sentinel communities. This is followed by design and field testing of the instruments that will collect and collate the quantitative and qualitative data. The cross design almost invariably includes household interviews, key informant interviews and an institutional review. Data are typically returned to the community and discussed in focus groups.

In Bolivia, the integrity survey began with the National Dialogue, which identified priority themes for inclusion. With the team from the Office of the Vice President, the detailed objectives of the survey were fine tuned and the instruments developed. The main focus of the survey was the police and justice system, in addition to the delays suffered by the public in their transactions with the public services.

The sample

The 50 sentinel sites were selected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. It was a stratified last-stage random sample; the main stratifications were levels of marginality and eco-zone, for which the sample was weighted by population (Annex 1). In each of the sentinel communities, some 100-150 households were contacted with an administered interview. In each community, local authorities were approached before the survey. Ten days after the survey, the results were returned to the communities in the form of a pamphlet that was distributed door to door. On this occasion, the focus groups were carried out.

⁴ Paredes S, Andersson N, Omer K. Gender gap in primary education. Secretary Planning & Development Department, Government of Sindh, Pakistan/Unicef. December 1996.

⁵ Andersson N, Villegas A, Paredes S. Micro-regional Planning. in Four Essays on Evidence-based Planning . CIETinternational: New York, 1995.

⁶ Andersson N, da Sousa C, Paredes C. Social costs of land mines in four countries. British Medical Journal. 1995;311:718-721

⁷ Andersson N, Paredes S, Legorreta J. The social conditions for health in Serbia. CIETinternational: New York. 1994

⁸ Arostegui J, Andersson N. Results-oriented management of Managua urban public transport. EDI/World Bank December 1995.

⁹ Andersson. Mesoanalysis. in Four Essays on Evidence-based Planning. CIETinternational: New York. 1995.

¹⁰ Arostegui J, Andersson N. Nicaragua: Impact of the National Environmental Programme. EDI/World Bank, December 1995.

¹¹ Cockcroft A. Effectiveness and efficiency of the Ugandan agricultural extension services. Government of Uganda. Ministry of Civil Service/World Bank. January 1996..

¹² Massoud N. Measuring client satisfaction and expectations: The Pilot Case in the Mali Public Service. EDI/World Bank. September 1995.

¹³ Cockcroft A. Tanzania Service Delivery Survey: Corruption in the Police, Judiciary, Revenue and Lands Service. EDI/World Bank July 1996.

Survey process

Between 24th January and 4th February 1998, 11 teams worked simultaneously across the Departments to implement the survey. Each team was made of six interviewers and a supervisor, supported in some cases by additional people from the communities. The household questionnaire dealt with the general perception of corruption in the public services, the use of bribes in transactions in public services, the services most urgently in need of attention, the characteristics of the latest transaction carried out. In addition to the household survey, there were three further questionnaires: one for the key informant who would have the best knowledge of public service transactions (for example, the Secretario General de la OTB, the Delegate, Jilacata, etc.); the second was directed at public service workers; and the third was directed and police and justice, focussing on the official registers (Annex 3).

Double data entry and verification relied on the public domain EpiInfo.

During the household interview, the supervisors identified six to ten people with different experiences with the public services, who they invited to take part in the focussed group discussions. On the day of the meeting, the interviewers distributed summary reports household to household. Both the supervisor, who served as the facilitator of the focus group, and the interviewer trained as the monitor, were fluent in the local language. A simple poster was made of the main results, to guide the focussed group discussion.

Box 3

The evidential base

Number of households	6,851
Number with transactions	5,020
Proportion rural	50.5%
People interviewed	32,640
Key informant interviews	45
Focussed group discussions	49
Service workers interviewed	258

THE RESULTS

The sentinel communities

The sample selected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) included representation from all parts of the country. The sample constitutes around 0.05% of the national population, according to the 1992 National Census.

Box 3 lists the evidential base of the enquiry. An average of 137 households were covered in each sentinel community. The division by eco-zone was roughly in proportion with the country: 53% were in the high altitude areas, 27% in the valleys and 20% in the tropical regions.

In the sample, 49.5% was urban and 50.5% rural; 30% was in highly marginalised communities, 25% in medium levels of marginalisation, 18% in medium to low and 27% in low levels of marginalisation. Eighteen of the 50 sites were in the cities of La Paz-El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, including 2,300 households (39% de the sample).

One half of the respondents (51%) were heads of household, 29% were wives of the head, 17% the oldest child and only 3% were others (grandparents, other relatives). The average age of the respondents was 38.7 years; some 3,284 (48%) were women.

Ten percent of heads of households said they had not received any education and 43% did not finish primary


school. Occupations included agriculture, factory workers, technicians, artisans public servants, drivers, businessmen, unemployed, retired, professionals, teachers and housewives.

HOW DOES THE COMMUNITY VIEW CORRUPTION

Type of respondent and head of household

Three out of every four respondents saw corruption in the public services as serious or very serious (Figure 1). There was little variation with age, sex or position in the family. There was, however, a notable difference by level of education and occupation. Higher levels of education were associated with greater appreciation of the severity of corruption; retired people, businessmen, public servants, professionals and teachers all returned estimates of high levels of corruption.

Figure 1
Perception of the severity of corruption




Type of community

Communities that were more marginalised were more likely to perceive more corruption (Figure 2). Urban communities were also significantly more likely to perceive the corruption as severe or very severe.

In the Department of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz there were 13% more opinions of corruption being severe or very severe than in the other Departments.

People who had recently made an interaction/transaction with a public service were more likely to feel that corruption was serious or very serious.

Figure 2
Perception of severity of corruption and degree of marginalisation



Perception of bribes

Similar to the overall perception about corruption, three out of every four respondents considered the use of bribes in the public services to be common or very common.

There were few differences between types of community and types of individual respondent. Urban respondents rate its prevalence higher than did rural ones. Again, those who recently had an interaction or transaction were more likely (81% compared with 69%) to consider bribery to be common or very common.

Services most in need of reform: the community view

Figure 3 presents the five services which, in public opinion, are most in need of attention. These five represent 71% of all those mentioned; among the others were health (4.1%), rates (3%), electricity (2.8%), rents (2.3%) and justice (1.8%).

With the exception of the Department of Pando, police were listed most frequently throughout the sample. In Potosí, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, police were mentioned by 40, 38 and 37 percent respectively. The mayors office (Alcaldía) shared second place with the customs service. Figure 3 also shows how, in the urban areas, the customs service features more strongly; in the rural areas, the Mayor's office is more prominent.

Previous contact with the services affected opinion; among those who recently were in contact with the justice sector, they were much more likely to mention the police.

The priority for reform: other points of view

Public service workers were also asked what they thought; they too focussed on the police and customs service (Figure 4).

The key informants in each community were also asked about which services used by the communities had the most obstacles. They said: lands (15%), birth certificates (11%), education and Mayor's office (9% each).

Figure 3
Five public services most in need of reform
(% urban and rural household respondents)





Figure 4
Opinion of public servants: what most needs to change



Contact with the justice and police

The police was by far the most commonly mentioned service in need of urgent attention regarding corruption; Figure 5 portrays the spread of opinions across Departments. No less than 2,069 households said they had contact with the police or justice, although the rate of contact also varied with Department. In Potosí, it was 56%; in Santa Cruz, 36%; Beni, 35%; Cochabamba, 33%; Oruro, 32%; Pando, 30%; La Paz, 22%; Tarija, 10% and Sucre, 8%.

The more marginal communities had higher levels of contact with the police and judiciary.

Two out of three had their contact with the Police Técnica Judicial (PTJ) 67%; 13% in the “Oficina Rural”, 13% in the Tribunales, and 9% in the Fiscalía. On average, they had to go 7.6 times to resolve their problem, investing an average of 22.4 hours per case.

Figure 5

The police is the priority for an anti-corruption focus -- % of responses in each Department




Table 1. Characteristics of the contact with police and the judiciary

	% PTJ/Police n=1348	% Fiscalía n= 190	% Tribunal n=227	% Of. Rural n= 277
Received orientation	48	50	49	34
Used services of a lawyer	29	62	76	16
Gave a bribe	27	24	30	25
Asked for a bribe	77	62	69	78
Of the opinion that it would have been quicker with a bribe	72	60	73	80
Prepared to pay more for better service, without bribes	34	41	45	28

Table 2. Number of visits required to complete transaction related to police and judiciary

Characteristics of transaction	PTJ and Police		Fiscalía		Tribunales		Oficina Rural	
	n	O	n	O	n	O	n	O
Did not bribe, nor use lawyer	619	3.5	59	3.5	42	7.5	165	2.7
Gave a bribe	294	4.1	11	5.7	6	18.6	49	3.1
Used services of a lawyer	165	8.3	79	8.8	89	16.2	22	5.7
Gave bribe and used lawyer	187	8.5	34	11	58	18	20	5.3

0 average number of visits

Table 1 describes the major aspects of the transactions with the police, broken down by where they went to deal with the problem. The difference made by using a lawyer and when receiving orientation are not easily explained by chance. One who used a lawyer was twice as likely to pay a bribe as one who did not. In the rural areas, this contrast was even stronger (Figure 6).

Table 2 shows how those who did not give a bribe not used a lawyer tended to have to contact the services less often to get the job done. Someone who used a lawyer was six times more likely to have to contact the services repeatedly (more than four times), compared with someone who did not.

Figure 7 stratifies for time elapsed since the transaction was done, showing differences between urban and rural areas. The different recall period made little difference in the urban areas; in the rural area there was a dramatic difference (Figure 7).

In part, the increased number of appearances could be linked to lawyers because lawyers might be used for more severe problems, which also need more visits to resolve.

Box 5
Why so concerned about the police?

Their behaviour:

- they do not show a positive example
- they get away with impunity
- they are not very educated

Their relationships with citizens:

- they invoke fear
- they treat people badly, especially the poor
- the beat detainees

They are corrupt:

- they demand payment for any service
- they do not give receipts
- they are part of the criminality

Their performance

- they are inefficient
- they incline towards whoever pays more

Figure 6

Chances of having to bribe when using the services of a lawyer





Figure 7

Risks of having to appear more than four times for a problem with the police, if using a lawyer



Why so concerned about the police?

In the 49 focussed group discussions, the unfavorable view of the police was discussed in more depth. Boxes 5 and 6 list some of the products of these discussions.

Costs of the police and justice service

Based on the number of times they had to go to the service to deal with their problem, a conservative estimate was derived of the time spent (four hours per visit). This cost, using the minimum value of \$25Bs for an eight hour shift, was added to the amount of the bribe paid and to the charges of the lawyer. Table 3 portrays the cost for each configuration, at the different institutions where they came in contact with the service.

Box 6

How does corruption happen in the police: community views

- They invent charges and intimidate
- Charge for everything and give no receipts
- Delay transactions to force a bribe
- They collaborate with the criminals
- Their bosses know about it or oblige them to do it
- They punish those that decline to bribe
- They incline in favour of those who pay most

Table 3. Cost of the bribe, lawyers charges and time invested

The cost*	PTJ and Police	Fiscalía	Tribunales	Oficina Rural
Did not give bribe, nor used lawyer				
Cost in time	43.75	43.75	93.75	33.75
Gave bribe	111.7	99.00	700.70	109.00
Cost in time	51.25	71.25	232.50	38.75
Total	162.95	170.25	933.20	147.75
Lawyers charge	160.2	433.2	1043.5	232.00
Cost in time	103.75	110.00	202.5	71.25
Total	263.95	543.20	1246.00	303.25
Gave bribe	271.00	154.00	304.00	63.3
Lawyers charge	449.20	449.20	708.8	110.5
Cost in time	106.50	137.50	225.00	66.25
Total	826.70	740.7	1237.80	240.05

Review of registers in the institutions dealing with justice

One of the principle complaints of the citizens was that police do not give receipts for fines; some citizens are in favour of this because it leaves them without a criminal record. For citizens to insist on receipts runs against their own interests.

The institutions dealing with justice were reviewed in each of the sites: 28 police stations, seven “Corregimientos”, six supreme courts, five courts and two Fiscalías. In one third of these institutions, there were no registers kept of detentions and referrals. The quality of registers was reviewed in those institutions that kept them. The ten main causes of detention were related to robbery, assault, homicide, rape, injury, family violence, disturbing the peace, traffic violations. Among the homicides and rapes registered, in 1997 only one half were referred to the courts.

Arranging documents in the public services

One in every four household had not ever had any interaction with the public services (23%). In the rural areas, this was double the rate in the urban areas (31% compared with 16%). It was also higher in the areas of low marginalisation (32%). There were important differences between Departments: 62% in Sucre and Beni had no such contact; in Tarija, 47%; Pando, 42%; Potosí, 35%; in La Paz, 17%; Cochabamba, 13%; Oruro, 9.5%; and Santa Cruz, 5%.

Table 4. Ten transactions most frequently carried out

Transaction	Number	% *
Identity card	1152	22
Rates	604	11.5
Regularise documents	532	10.2
Tax payment	478	9.1
Birth certificate	476	9.1
Title deed of lands	244	4.7
Water connection	180	3.4
Electricity connection	170	3.2
Arranging pensions	109	2.1
Línea nivel	107	2
No information	103	2

*a further 21% were mentioned in other smaller categories

Table 5. Delays in the transaction (percentage)

Transaction	immediate	1-4 days	5 days - 4 weeks	1-12 months	1-3 years
ID card	5	52	20	19	3
Tax payment	24	42	17	13	3
Regularise documents	8	32	21	32	7
Title deeds	0	7	23	56	14
Birth certificates	12	40	22	22	3
Rates	4	13	18	50	15

Among the 5,020 households that had a transaction, 1,992 did so in the last six months (29%). Table 4 presents the ten most frequent transactions. In what follows, only the six most common transactions are dealt with, making up two thirds of the total.

Delays in completing transactions

Table 5 reflects the delays in completing the transaction. The payment of rates and legalisation of land tenancy took the longest, with 65 and 70% respectively took between one month and one year. To obtain and ID card, which theoretically can be obtained comfortably within two days, only 57% of applicants received this in under five days. Of the remainder, 20% had to wait between one and four weeks; 19% from one to twelve months and three percent as long as a year.

In order to legalise the title of their land, on average people had to make 11.7 visits; to obtain a birth certificate, five times; to pay rates, 12.7 times, the tax payment took 4.8 visits; the regularization of

documents, 9.7 visits, while arranging an ID card 3.3 days.

These data indicate a ready opportunity for the services to demonstrate a quick turnaround in reform. The reform process could target turnaround in a small number of transactions (for example, birth certificates and ID cards). Then, within six months, a repeat survey could show a reduction in the processing time for each of the transactions, reduced levels of bribery needed to get the job done, and a reduction in the “support industry” of lawyers and intermediaries.

The use of intermediaries

One in four households used an intermediary to navigate through the bureaucratic processes. On average, they paid \$169.60Bs each time they used these services.

The most constant factor use of a bribe was, in effect, the use of an intermediary. A person who used an intermediary for land title, taxes, birth certificate, regularise documents, rates or getting an ID card, was two and a half times more likely to pay a bribe -- in addition to the costs of the intermediary -- than someone who did not use an intermediary.

Figure 9 shows the risk of having to pay a bribe. In both urban and rural areas, someone had to deal with a land title or pay taxes, if using an intermediary was four to seven times as likely to pay a bribe. This is effect was even stronger in the marginal areas, where the communities are poorer and probably have less social access to the services. In poor urban areas, someone using an intermediary was 8.6 times more likely to use a bribe than someone in the same community who did not use an intermediary.

Orientation in the public services

“Orientation” refers to advice or information available to citizens about how to fulfil the bureaucratic requirements. Only 59% said they received any orientation in the last service where they had an interaction. Those that did receive orientation were only slightly better off than those who did not.

Considering simultaneously quality of service and the use of intermediary, in fact there was little benefit of orientation at all. The positive effect of orientation was discernible among those who received notably bad service but who used an intermediary; among these, one who received no

Figure 8
Delays in the transaction: proportion that were completed rapidly




Figure 9
Use of intermediary and bribe: Risk of having to pay if one used an intermediary, compared with one who did not





Figure 10
Duration and orientation: risk of protracted duration without orientation



orientation was 40% more likely to have delayed completion of his transaction (longer than two weeks) (Figure 10).

From the point of view of orientation as an intervention: if it was possible somehow to convince all services to give orientation to the users, because only a small segment actually benefits from this while services are bad and the industry of intermediaries is intact, the gain would be little. Only three percent would be in a better position regarding delays.

At the same time as introducing orientation, it is clearly also necessary to improve the quality of attention and to influence the industry of intermediaries in a decisive way (Box 7).

of bribes in public services

One in four users had to give a bribe for his/her last transaction with the public services. The average amount given was \$31.50Bs. Of the 1323 users who gave a bribe, 837 (63%) said they were asked to give this; the remainder said they gave it voluntarily to facilitate the process. Three out of four (77%) of those using bribes said they would not have done this if their transaction could have been done in less time.

Box 7
Demands for orientation in the public services

- Publish requirement for transactions
- Publish costs of transactions
- How long should it take
- Where one has to do what
- Complaints box

Users were asked if they were prepared to pay for a better service if this could be done without a bribe. Some 78% (3,799) said yes, whether this was the government (46%), Mayor's office or Prefectura (6.1%); paying a bank (8.4%); intermediary (6.8%); or directly to the service worker (24%). Table 6 lists the main characteristics for each of the most frequent transactions.

Table 6. Characteristics of the most frequent transactions (percent)

Characteristics of transaction	Title deeds %	Birth certificate %	Pay rates %	Taxes %	Regularise docum. %	ID card %
Received orientation	60	56	60	60	56	59
Used intermediary	32	24	36	16	30	15
Gave a bribe voluntarily	24	23	30	17	26	28
They were asked for a bribe	62	67	61	54	66	70
Think it would have been quick with a bribe	84	72	83	66	78	75
Prepared to pay more for a better service without bribes	53	48	51	47	47	48

The average amount they were prepared to pay for a better service, without bribes, for title deeds was \$85Bs; for birth certificates \$ 39Bs; rates, \$92Bs; tax payment, \$62.70; regularization of documents \$81.30; and ID card \$18Bs. In the case of rates and tax payment, each payment is a function of the type of property and the nature of the tax -- in these cases, bribes are usual to reduce the amount paid to the state.

Tables 7 and 8 attempt to summarise the costs of the current system. Most of the cost is born by the users, but these are also revenues lost to the state, which also pays the salaries of the civil servants who benefit most from the system.

Table 7. Number of visits to complete the transaction, the use of bribes and intermediaries

Service	No bribe and no intermediary		With bribe but no intermediary		No bribe but with intermediary		With bribe and with intermediary		Altogether	
	n	O	n	O	n	O	n	O	n	O
Land title deed	133	10.5	24	14.7	43	10.6	32	13.3	236	11.7
Birth certificate	272	4	77	5.3	75	9	32	7.6	463	5.2
Rates	260	10.6	85	16.2	113	11.5	75	16.5	541	12.7
Taxes	345	3.9	40	6.9	37	5.7	33	11.7	464	4.8
Regularize documents	274	7.8	71	9.8	89	10.6	54	18.5	497	9.7
ID card	700	3.1	232	3.1	92	5.5	79	3.6	1131	3.3

Table 8. The amounts of bribes, cost of intermediary and time lost in completing the transaction

The cost*	Title deed	Birth certificate	Rates	Taxes	Reg documents	ID card
Neither bribe nor intermediary:						
Cost in time	131.25	50	132.5	48.75	97.5	38.75
Bribe	78.2	58.9	103.0	103.6	87.40	33.60
Cost in time	183.75	66.25	202.5	86.25	122.50	38.75
Total	261.95	125.15	305.5	189.85	209.90	72.35
Intermediary	123.0	135.0	198.0	94.60	161.30	50.30
Cost in time	132.50	112.5	143.75	71.25	132.50	68.75
Total	255.50	247.5	341.75	165.85	293.80	119.05
Bribe	78.20	58.9	103.0	103.60	87.40	33.60
Intermediary	123.00	112.5	198.0	94.60	161.30	50.30
Cost in time	166.25	95.0	206.25	146.25	231.25	45.00
Total	367.45	266.4	507.25	344.45	479.95	128.90


*The cost in time was based on an estimated half work day, calculated at \$25.00 Bs per work day

The role of the bribe in facilitating transactions

Contrary to what might have been expected, though consistent with findings in other countries, the use of bribes is associated with a slowing of the already tardy process. Birth certificates, regularization of documents, payment of rates and taxes, if an intermediary was involved, was nearly twice as likely to go beyond three days (Figure 11).

It is possible that an intermediary is approached after initial attempts had failed. In future more detailed surveys, it will be useful to know at what point the bribe is given and when the intermediaries are introduced to the process.

Figure 11
Bribes and the risk of protracted transactions (four or more visits)




Satisfaction with the service received

Tables 9 and 10 show the scores of the quality of attention received and speed with which the transaction was completed. The highest levels of satisfaction with quality were reported in relation to birth certificates; the worst was in relation to title deeds for land and payments of rates (Figure 12).

The service that gained the lowest scores for speed of the transaction was rates, which was also the service that required the largest number of visits, where the average cost to the user was highest and the highest proportion had to give a bribe (Tables 7, 8 and 10). These data point to an easy first target for an administration seeking to demonstrate an impact against corruption. The problem is, however, in the nature of the bribe. This is almost invariably to achieve agreement between the rate payer and the public servant to establish an artificially low level of rates. In this sense, the complicity and mutual gain of the users and the service worker – essentially the illegality of the transaction -- is at the cost of the state.

Figure 12
Proportion scoring the quality of service as bad or very bad



This dynamic contrasts with that of the birth certificate which, however it is looked at, is the right of the user. In this case, the service worker and intermediaries insert themselves between the service user and the state, profiting from depriving the citizens of their rights (or delaying them).

Table 9. Scores of quality of the most recent transaction (percent of respondents)

Transaction	n	Score of service received				
		very good	good	so-so	bad	very bad
Title deed	241	1.2	29	49.4	16.6	37
Birth certificate	472	2.5	48.3	35	11.7	2.5
Rates	598	1	23	50	20	6
Tax payment	598	1.9	36.5	47	12	2.3
Regularization of documents	477	1.7	31	46.7	15.7	4.6
ID card	1140	0.8	39.8	43.1	15	0

Table 10. Degree of satisfaction with the speed of completion of the most recent transaction (percents)

Transaction	n	Degree of satisfaction with the speed of completion				
		very satisfied	satisfied	so-so	dissatisfied	very dissatisfied
Title deed	243	3.7	28	31.7	32.5	4.1
Birth certificate	473	1.5	48	24.5	24.7	1.7
Rates	597	1.8	25.6	29.3	38	5.2
Tax payment	476	2.3	35.3	35	25.8	1.5
Regularization of documents	528	1.1	31	30.9	32.6	4
ID card	1135	1.1	43	29.3	24.3	2

Table 11. Opinion of how to improve the quality of service

How to improve	title deed %	Birth certif %	Rates %	Taxes %	Reg docs %	IDcard %
Change personnel	23	18	25	23	21	18
"Improve service"	12	8	11	9	11	9
No change	12	24	11	19	15	22
Reduce red tape	8	4	6	12	9	9
Change supervisors	7	5	5	5	5	3
Train	5	6	5	8	7	6

PROPOSALS TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES

Some very general proposals were made by the respondents, mostly of a political nature; others were very concrete, like those related to orientation, the lack of information. In the present report, most of the more radical political proposals are not discussed further, although it must be noted that these are very much part of the community level analysis of corruption.

Table 11 summarises the most frequently mentioned proposals to improve the quality of services, with a view to reducing corruption. In general, these were uninspired and non-specific -- almost as many said that no change would help as requested change in personnel. There were no really incisive suggestions apart from the quite specific demands for orientation that might avoid people having to rely on intermediaries quite so much.

Box 8 Proposals to reduce corruption and to improve services at municipal level

General measures

- Delink from political processes
- Show audits and transparency

Administrative measures

- Better fiscal control
- Pay to banks

Related to staff

- Change staff, particularly supervisors
- Increase salaries
- Train personnel
- Improve awareness of personnel

Table 12 provides the responses for three other services (police are dealt with below).

Table 12

Opinions how to reduce corruption in the Customs, education and health services (% of households that replied)

	Customs	Education	Health services
Train staff	10%	5%	10%
Change supervisors	4%	3%	5%
Increase salaries	11%	4%	14%
Financial control	11%	21%	9%
Change staff	11%	18%	13%

Reducing corruption in the police

Community view: The views of householders are reflected in Box 9. Some recommendations are quite general, others very specific.

Police view: Some 73 police officers were interviewed; most of them (85%) recognised the existence of corruption in the police. In order to reduce this, 61% said it is necessary to increase salaries; 13% mentioned increased supervision, 10% said they needed training, and 5% suggested a change of personnel.

None of the officers interviewed said they did *not* need training; one in five said they had received some. Among the types of training requested were “being brought up to date” 40%; computing 15%; about laws, norms and processes 6%.

Asked what they needed in their facility to do their job adequately, 25% said equipment, 17% said financial support, 17% said logistics, 13% transport, 13% said more staff, 9% said new facilities and 3% said an improved attitude (Box 10).

Prepared to represent community views on the services most in need of reform

Asked if they were prepared to represent their communities, nearly two thirds (59%) said yes.

People were more likely to be prepared to take these issues further if they had recently experienced a transaction with a government service.

Box 9 To reduce corruption in the police

General measures:

- Make known civil rights
- New laws to reduce impunity of police
- Punish corrupt police

Administrative measures:

- Better supervision
- Coordination with local authorities
- Local accountability

Personnel related:

- Demand school-leaving certificate
- Increase salaries
- Replace corrupt officials
- Train and increase awareness
- Make them show identification

Box 10 How to improve the registers and fulfilling their functions

Local & infrastructure	23%
Furniture & equipment	21%
Communication	17%
Vehicles	15%
Office materials	12%
More personal	8%
Celdas	3%
Higher salaries	3%

ANNEX 1: TECHNICAL TABLES

Table 1
Occupation of the heads of households

Occupation	Frequency	%
Agriculture	1846	26.9
Artisan, workers	1358	19.8
Public servant	768	11.2
Driver	560	8.2
Business	475	6.9
Unemployed/retired	441	6.4
Professional services	386	5.6
Teachers	312	4.6
Housewife	267	3.9
Service worker	231	3.4
Underemployed	52	0.8
Other activities	59	0.9
No information	96	1.4
Total	6851	100

Table 2
Perception of the degree of corruption in the public services

Corruption	n	%
Very serious	1630	24.5
Serious	3597	54
So-so	1070	16
Not serious	172	4
Nothing	75	1
Total	6644	100

Table 3
Perception of corruption and education of respondent

	up to primary complete	Secondary complete	Professional
Very serious	20	26.9	39.8
Serious	54.4	53.8	46.4
So-so	17.8	14.1	10.8
Not serious	4.6	3.4	2.7
Nothing	3.1	2.7	0.3

Table 4
Perception of corruption and eco-zone of respondent

	High altitude %	Valleys %	Tropics %
Very serious	22.4	20.3	22.4
Serious	57.6	54.8	56.5
So-so	12.1	16.6	13.8
Not serious	6	5.6	5.4
Nothing	1.9	2.8	1.9
n	3617	1823	1289

Table 5
Perception of corruption and degree of marginality of the community

	High	medium high	medium low	low
Very serious	33.4	21.2	14.5	14.1
Serious	55.2	58.7	62	52.7
So-so	7.3	14.4	13.4	20.2
Not serious	3.1	4.3	6.9	9.5
Nothing	1	1.4	3.2	3.5
n	2058	1703	1196	1772

Table 6
Perception of corruption and occupation of head of household

	Very serious	Serious	So-so	Not serious	Nothing
Agriculture	16.5	55	18.4	5.2	4.9
Artisan, workers	23.2	54.5	16.6	3.9	1.9
Public servant	28	51.8	14.3	3.8	2.1
Driver	24.7	53.9	16.8	4.1	0.5
Business	27.6	52	14	5.1	1.3
Unemployed/retired	32.9	53.1	11.5	1.6	0.9
Professional services	37.6	47.2	10.6	3.4	1.3
Teachers	29.6	54.3	13.5	1.6	1
Housewife	22.4	47.1	23.2	4.2	3.1
Service worker	25.7	58.6	11.7	3.5	0.9
Underemployed	34.6	38.5	21.2	3.8	1.9
Other	22	57.6	15.3	5.1	0
Without information	24.2	53.5	15.9	4.2	2.4

Table 7
Perception of the use of bribes in the public services

Use of bribes	n	%
Very common	1470	22
Common	3812	56
So-so	916	14
Not common	388	6
None	146	2
Total	6732	100

Table 8
Five services most in need of reform for corruption, urban and rural

Service	Urban	Rural
Police	31	31
Customs	15.7	8
All	11.7	8
Mayor's Office	10	14
Education	5	5
n	3372	3249

Table 9
Five services most in need of reform, by Department

Departament	1st.Serv. %	2nd . Serv. %	3rd. Serv. %	4rd.Serv. %	5th.Serv %
Chuquisaca	Police 27	Mayor 16	Customs 15	All 7	Agriculture 5
La Paz	Police 29	All 18	Mayor 13	Customs 8	Education 7
Cochabamba	Police 38	Customs 9	Rates 8	Luz 6	Education 5
Oruro	Police 24	Customs 20	Rates 10	All 10	Health 10
Potosí	Police 40	Customs 18	Mayor 15	Education 6	All 4
Tarija	Police 23	Customs 22	Mayor 12	Education 9	All 7
Santa Cruz	Police 37	Customs 14	Mayor 12	Rent 4	Garbage 4
Beni	Police 27	Mayor 19	Health 8	Education 7	All 7
Pando	Mayor 28	Prefectura 16	Luz 10	Police 9	Customs 8
País	Police 31	Customs 12	Mayor 12	All 10	Education 6

Table 10
Five services most in need of reform and degree of marginality

Marginality	1st.Serv. %	2nd . Serv. %	3rd. Serv. %	4rd.Serv. %	5th.Serv %
High	Police 32	Customs 15	All 13	Mayor 10	Education 5
Medium high	Police 34	Mayor 12	Customs 12	All 8	Education 5
Medium low	Police 27	Mayor 14	All 11	Customs 10	Education 7
Low	Police 31	Mayor 12	Customs 9	Education 6	All 6
Country	Police 31	Customs 12	Mayor 12	All 10	Education 6

Table 11**Five services most in need of reform and degree of urbanisation**

Area	n	1st.Serv. %	2nd Serv. %	3rd Serv. %	4rd.Serv. %	5th.Serv %
Urban	3372	Police 32	Customs 16	Todos 12	Mayor 10	Education 5
Rural	3249	Police 31	Customs 8	Todos 8	Mayor 14	Education 5

Table 12**How to reduce corruption: household survey**

Solutions	Police		Customs		Mayor		Education		Health	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Change staff	342	16	141	18	164	21	48	13	32	11
Financial control	256	12	168	21	107	13	35	9	31	11
Increase salaries	223	11	30	4	49	6	52	14	32	11
Change bosses	173	8	25	3	59	8	19	5	10	4
Train	173	8	37	5	30	4	39	10	29	10

Table 13**Quality of attention**

Transaction	n	Very good	Good	Regular	Mala	Very Mala
Title deed	241	1.2	29	49.4	16.6	37
Birth certificate	472	2.5	48.3	35	11.7	2.5
Rates	598	1	23	50	20	6
Taxes	598	1.9	36.5	47	12	2.3
Regularise docs	477	1.7	31	46.7	15.7	4.6
ID card	1140	0.8	39.8	43.1	15	0

Table 14
Use of a lawyer and the risk of having to give a bribe

		Used a lawyer		
Gave bribe		Yes	No	Total
Yes		313	638	681
No		382	916	1298
Total		695	1284	1979

OR 2.04 X²mh 53.55 LC95% 1.7-2.49 RD 0.16 LC95% 0.11-0.20

Analysis of potential confounders

Factor	OR	X ² mh	X ² het	df	p
How long ago	2.07	49.8	3.5	1	0.06
Number of visits	1.71	24.47	0.47	1	0.49
Where was service	2.58	77.23	0.52	2	0.77
Ecological zone	2.0	48.75	2.0	2	0.36
Degree of marginality	1.97	47.43	5.94	3	0.11
Geographic area	1.96	46.17	6.5	1	0.01
Type of respondent	2.02	51.91	3.83	2	0.15
Education of respondent	2.03	51.04	0.50	2	0.77
Occupation of head household	2.03	53.64	0.43	1	0.51
Age of respondent	2.03	52.0	3.54	2	0.17
Sex of respondent	2.03	52.17	5.61	1	0.02
Number of household member	2.04	52.72	0.89	1	0.34
Perception of corruption	2.02	51.4	3.47	1	0.06
Perception of bribes	1.96	47.0	5.26	1	0.02
Availability to represent community	2.04	53.55	2.75	1	0.10
Time spent in transaction	1.77	30.65	1.07	1	0.3
Type of attention received	1.88	39.65	0.06	1	0.80
Speed in completing transaction	1.85	37.32	0.03	1	0.87
Orientation	2.01	48.46	0.07	1	0.80

Table 15
Use of a lawyer and number of visits to complete transaction

Number of visits	Used services of lawyer		Total
	Yes	No	
Four or more	468	365	833
One-three visits	232	968	1200
Total	700	1303	2003

OR 5.8, X²mh 17.88, LC95% 4.4-7.2 RD 0.41, LC95% 0.37-0.45

Analysis of potential confounders

Factor	OR	X ² mh	X ² het	df	p
How long ago	5.8	2898	836	1	<0.01
Gave bribe	5.6	2866	47	1	49
Where	4.3	19212	35	2	17
Eco-zone	5.8	3177	183	2	40
Degree of marginality	5.5	2983	603	3	11
Geographic area	5.2	2737	644	1	<0.01
Type of respondent	5.8	3173	141	2	49
Level of education	5.8	3135	402	1	4
Occupation	5.8	3172	37	1	6
Age of respondent	5.9	320	17	2	42
Sex of respondent	5.8	31486	76	1	38
Number of people in household	5.8	319	60	1	43
Perception of corruption	5.8	3172	114	1	28
Perception of bribes	5.6	2994	92	1	33
Available to represent community	5.8	31494	3	1	86
Time lost in transaction	4.9	202	33	1	56
Type of service received	5.6	2844	47	1	49
Speed in completing transaction	5.3	2655	267	1	10
Orientation	5.9	3072	283	1	9

Table 16
Use of intermediary and risk of having to give a bribe

Used service of intermediary			
Gave bribe	yes	No	Total
Yes	518	796	1313
No	756	3051	3808
Total	1272	3846	5120

OR 2.63 X²mh 200.5 LC95% 2.3 -3.0 RD 0.20 LC95% 0.17-0.23

Analysis of potential confounders

Factor	OR	X ² mh	X ² het	gl	p
How long ago	2.67	196.8	2.78	1	0.1
Gave bribe	2.6	180	0.04	1	0.82
Where	2.4	104	25.5	5	0.0001
Eco-zone	2.6	198.6	0.7	2	0.7
Degree of marginality	2.6	199.3	40.1	3	<0.01
Geographic area	2.6	201	29	1	<0.01
Type of respondent	2.6	201	0.39	2	0.82
Level of education	2.7	204.7	11.98	3	<0.01
Occupation	2.9	177	6.45	3	0.09
Age of respondent	2.6	201	137	2	0.93
Sex of respondent	2.6	202.4	1.06	1	0.3
Number of people in household	2.6	202	1.18	1	0.27
Perception of corruption	2.7	205.6	3.3	4	0.5
Perception of bribes	2.7	210	2.78	4	0.59
Available to represent community	2.6	199.7	0.52	1	0.47
Time lost in transaction	2.7	203.7	2.87	1	0.09
Type of service received	2.6	199	3.6	1	0.84
Speed in completing transaction	2.7	202	3	1	<0.01
Orientation	2.6	191.7	1.03	1	0.31